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This	  critical	  and	  reflective	  literature	  review	  examines	  international	  research	  published	  over	  
the	  last	  decade	  to	  summarise	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  measures	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  
explore	  cognitive	  load	  and	  critiques	  the	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of	  those	  focussed	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  direct	  empirical	  approaches.	  Over	  the	  last	  40	  years,	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  
has	  become	  established	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  and	  influential	  theoretical	  
explanations	  of	  cognitive	  processing	  during	  learning.	  Despite	  this	  success,	  attempts	  to	  obtain	  
direct	  objective	  measures	  of	  the	  theory’s	  central	  theoretical	  construct	  –	  cognitive	  load	  –	  
have	  proved	  elusive.	  This	  obstacle	  represents	  the	  most	  significant	  outstanding	  challenge	  for	  
successfully	  embedding	  the	  theoretical	  and	  experimental	  work	  on	  cognitive	  load	  in	  empirical	  
data	  from	  authentic	  learning	  situations.	  Progress	  to	  date	  on	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  
approaches	  to	  cognitive	  load	  are	  discussed	  along	  with	  the	  influences	  of	  individual	  
differences	  on	  cognitive	  load	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  prospects	  for	  the	  development	  and	  
application	  of	  direct	  empirical	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  especially	  in	  technology-­‐rich	  
contexts.	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One	  of	  the	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  educational	  provision	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  the	  
increasing	  interest	  in	  collaborative	  and	  blended	  e-­‐learning,	  fuelled	  by	  the	  increasing	  ubiquity	  
of	  educational	  technology	  and	  social	  media	  and	  their	  many	  affordances.	  Pressures	  for	  the	  
use	  of	  e-­‐learning	  and	  interest	  in	  more	  collaborative	  pedagogies	  have	  also	  arisen	  from	  desires	  
to	  enhance	  institutional	  profile	  and	  “outreach”,	  from	  student	  demand,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  
open-­‐access	  resources	  and	  interest	  in	  moving	  away	  from	  a	  top-­‐down	  instructor-­‐led	  
pedagogy.	  	  
	  
These	  pressures	  have	  so	  far	  been	  felt	  more	  in	  higher	  and	  further	  education	  than	  in	  
mainstream	  provision	  but	  have	  combined	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  traditional	  
instructor,	  about	  how	  to	  promote	  greater	  student	  engagement,	  and	  for	  ways	  to	  satisfy	  
student	  demands	  for	  learner-­‐centred	  provision	  and	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  funding	  regimes	  
that	  have	  increasingly	  elevated	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  student	  voice	  across	  all	  educational	  
sectors.	  
	  
Such	  debates	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  e-­‐learning	  and	  collaborative	  learning	  
and	  interest	  in	  how	  we	  might	  develop	  blended	  learning	  and	  an	  instructional	  model	  that	  is	  
able	  to	  guide	  developments	  of	  technology	  use.	  Current	  technologies	  offer	  attractive	  
possibilities	  for	  more	  effective	  learning,	  may	  encourage	  anywhere	  anytime	  education,	  may	  
improve	  social	  interaction	  and	  enable	  individualised	  learning,	  efficiency	  gains	  for	  
institutions,	  and	  stronger	  student	  engagement	  (Shuler,	  2009).	  Advocates	  of	  technology	  use	  
have	  argued	  that	  contemporary	  students	  are	  more	  attuned	  to	  learning	  with	  technology	  –	  
that	  they	  even	  think	  and	  learn	  differently	  than	  previous	  generations	  of	  students.	  Although	  
technology	  is	  felt	  to	  offer	  the	  prospect	  of	  more	  effective	  learning,	  there	  is	  relatively	  little	  
empirical	  evidence	  showing	  that	  gains	  in	  educationally	  desirable	  outcomes	  are	  greater	  with	  
the	  use	  of	  technology	  than	  with	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  learning.	  This	  is	  of	  special	  concern	  
where	  content	  retention	  may	  be	  becoming	  a	  necessary	  but	  insufficient	  output	  of	  education	  
in	  a	  world	  where	  higher	  order	  thinking	  skills,	  creativity,	  and	  problem	  solving	  are	  often	  seen	  
as	  the	  most	  valuable	  cognitive	  attributes	  for	  future	  citizens	  and	  the	  industries	  and	  
economies	  that	  will	  sustain	  them.	  So,	  whilst	  the	  growing	  use	  of	  digital	  technology	  and	  its	  
application	  to	  learning	  is	  argued	  to	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  significantly	  improve	  instructional	  
efficacy,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  successful	  learning	  of	  information	  and	  the	  
development	  of	  understanding	  or	  skill	  (Mayer,	  2008;	  Miller,	  Chang,	  Wang,	  Beier,	  &	  Klisch,	  
2011),	  concerns	  persist	  about	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  design	  and	  use	  of	  digital	  learning	  
materials	  have	  realised	  or	  optimised	  such	  potential	  (Argyris,	  1976;	  Massa	  &	  Mayer,	  2006;	  
Schnotz	  &	  Kürschner,	  2007;	  Sweller	  &	  Chandler,	  1994;	  Tabbers,	  Martens,	  &	  Van	  
Merriënboer,	  2000).	  
	  
To	  ensure	  that	  educational	  interventions	  in	  e-­‐learning,	  collaborative	  learning,	  and	  also	  
more	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  learning	  are	  optimum	  and	  effective,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  
instruments	  with	  which	  to	  assess	  the	  outcomes	  from	  such	  learning	  in	  complex	  and	  ill-­‐
structured	  domains	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  factual	  knowledge.	  Such	  assessments	  require	  a	  
theoretical	  model	  of	  learning	  that	  is	  accessible	  to	  empirical	  verification	  and	  extends	  beyond	  
mapping	  the	  retention	  of	  information,	  and	  for	  these	  reasons	  the	  concept	  of	  cognitive	  load	  
and	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  have	  attracted	  much	  interest.	  
	  
Although	  there	  remains	  a	  preponderance	  of	  single-­‐study	  work	  in	  the	  field	  of	  cognitive	  
load	  research,	  there	  has	  been	  activity	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  subject	  areas	  from	  
mathematics,	  reading,	  physical	  exercise,	  repetitive	  spaced	  learning	  and	  testing,	  and	  in	  a	  
range	  of	  approaches	  including	  “brain	  training”	  learning	  games,	  embodied	  cognition	  (learning	  
through	  action),	  and	  the	  personalisation	  of	  experiential	  learning.	  Pedagogical	  approaches	  
have	  been	  similarly	  varied	  although	  the	  evidence	  of	  improved	  engagement	  and	  increased	  
learning	  with	  learning	  games	  is	  as	  yet	  limited	  to	  results	  from	  young	  adults	  (Howard-­‐	  
Jones,	  2014),	  and	  the	  established	  perceptions	  of	  educators	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	  particular	  
methods	  are	  often	  not	  supported	  by	  research	  evidence	  (Coe,	  Cesare,	  Higgins,	  &	  Major,	  
2014;	  Martin,	  2010).	  
	  
This	  systematic	  review	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  introduction	  to	  cognitive	  load	  and	  its	  
measurement	  and	  a	  synthesis	  and	  critical	  review	  of	  research	  findings	  in	  the	  field	  particularly	  
over	  the	  last	  decade	  for	  both	  newer	  and	  experienced	  researchers.	  This	  review	  also	  identifies	  
how	  previous	  research	  has	  approached	  the	  measuring	  of	  cognitive	  load	  in	  relation	  to	  
learning	  outcomes	  and	  summarises,	  evaluates,	  and	  critically	  reflects	  upon	  the	  implications.	  
	  
	   	  
Context	  
	  
The	  application	  of	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  (Sweller,	  Van	  Merriënboer,	  &	  Paas,	  1998)	  has	  been	  
at	  the	  forefront	  of	  much	  experimental	  work	  in	  cognition	  and	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  
optimising	  the	  design	  of	  educational	  multimedia	  (Martin,	  2012;	  Mayer,	  2003,	  2009;	  Mayer	  
&	  Moreno,	  2002).	  However,	  some	  writers	  express	  concern	  that	  the	  theory	  has	  developed	  
little	  since	  its	  proposition	  in	  1998	  (Moreno	  &	  Park,	  2010),	  whilst	  others	  note	  that	  despite	  
its	  great	  influence	  on	  educational	  research	  in	  recent	  years	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  is	  by	  its	  
formulation	  difficult	  to	  disprove;	  a	  difficulty	  compounded	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  means	  by	  which	  
cognitive	  load	  may	  be	  measured	  directly	  (De	  Jong,	  2010).	  
	  
From	  Karl	  Popper’s	  perspective	  of	  critical	  rationalism,	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  cannot	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  truly	  scientific	  theory	  because	  several	  of	  its	  fundamental	  assumptions	  are	  not	  
falsifiable,	  as	  they	  cannot	  be	  tested	  empirically	  (Popper,	  1959,	  1963).	  For	  each	  of	  the	  three	  
types	  of	  cognitive	  load	  proposed	  by	  the	  theory	  (germane,	  extraneous,	  and	  intrinsic	  cognitive	  
load),	  similar	  assumptions	  are	  made:	  For	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  extraneous	  cognitive	  
load,	  this	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  poor	  instructional	  design;	  and	  it	  is	  also	  assumed	  that	  
cognitive	  processes	  that	  do	  not	  support	  schema	  construction	  or	  automation	  result	  in	  
extraneous	  cognitive	  load;	  and	  that	  this	  is	  harmful	  for	  learning.	  
	  
The	  difficulty	  with	  adhering	  to	  strict	  Popperian	  concerns	  about	  falsifiability	  is	  that	  it	  
leads	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  hardly	  any	  theory	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  scientific.	  Many	  well	  
established	  scientific	  or	  logical	  statements	  and	  theories	  are	  based	  on	  fundamental	  
assumptions	  that	  are	  presupposed	  by	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  test	  them	  and	  are	  not	  therefore	  
falsifiable	  (see	  the	  “some	  swans	  are	  white”	  discussion	  in	  Blanshard,	  1962).	  We	  tend	  to	  
accept	  and	  apply	  many	  ideas	  that	  cannot	  be	  proved	  to	  be	  true	  but	  provisionally	  accept	  them	  
because	  they	  can	  usefully	  be	  discarded	  if	  they	  can	  be	  proved	  to	  be	  false.	  So,	  we	  tend	  to	  use	  
theories	  in	  science	  primarily	  because	  they	  are	  able	  to	  explain	  our	  observations	  of	  the	  
empirical	  world	  and	  we	  replace	  them	  when	  theories	  with	  even	  more	  explanatory	  power	  
appear,	  as	  happened	  when	  Darwin’s	  theory	  of	  evolution	  by	  natural	  selection	  replaced	  the	  
Lamarckian	  theory	  of	  evolution	  by	  the	  inheritance	  of	  acquired	  characteristics.	  
	  
So,	  critical	  rationalists	  would	  regard	  it	  as	  improper	  for	  researchers	  to	  assume,	  for	  
example,	  that	  any	  increase	  in	  measured	  cognitive	  load	  would	  result	  in	  poorer	  learning	  
(or	  vice	  versa),	  as	  this	  presupposes	  the	  assumption	  that	  higher	  cognitive	  load	  is	  unhelpful	  
for	  learning	  (an	  unproven	  hypothesis).	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  necessary	  to	  remove	  such	  
presuppositions	  about	  the	  outcomes	  of	  experiments	  that	  are	  embedded	  within	  the	  rationale	  
for	  the	  experiment.	  To	  address	  such	  concerns,	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  would	  also	  need	  to	  use	  
measurement	  instruments	  that	  were	  able	  to	  accurately	  discriminate	  between	  the	  three	  
types	  of	  cognitive	  load.	  This	  remains	  problematic	  in	  much	  published	  research,	  where	  
many	  established	  instruments	  are	  not	  sensitive	  to	  different	  types	  of	  cognitive	  load	  and	  
provide	  only	  one	  composite	  measure	  of	  cognitive	  load	  (see	  Paas	  &	  Van	  Merriënboer,	  
1994,	  for	  physiological	  measures;	  Brünken,	  Plass,	  &	  Leutner,	  2003,	  and	  Callan,	  Sutton,	  
&	  Dovale,	  2010,	  for	  dual-­‐task	  measures;	  and	  Paas,	  1992,	  for	  single-­‐item	  rating	  scales).	  
However,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  more	  recently	  developed	  objective	  measures	  such	  as	  
functional	  near	  infrared	  spectroscopy	  (fNIRS)	  to	  help	  meet	  Popperian	  concerns	  without	  
invoking	  the	  assumptions	  that	  provoke	  the	  criticism	  of	  structural	  rationalists	  (Cierniak,	  




Previously	  conceived	  as	  “mental	  load”	  (Moray,	  1979),	  research	  on	  cognitive	  load	  has	  been	  
of	  significant	  interest	  for	  over	  forty	  years,	  during	  which	  time	  it	  has	  developed	  into	  what	  is	  
now	  a	  leading	  theory	  for	  describing	  cognition	  in	  learning,	  especially	  with	  digital	  technologies	  
(Chandler	  &	  Sweller,	  1991;	  Martin,	  2012;	  Mayer,	  2001;	  Niegemann,	  2001).	  The	  concept	  of	  
cognitive	  load	  and	  its	  associated	  theoretical	  framework	  are	  increasingly	  used	  to	  guide	  the	  
instructional	  design	  and	  evaluation	  of	  educational	  multimedia	  environments	  and	  web-­‐based	  
instruction.	  However,	  despite	  decades	  of	  research	  on	  cognitive	  load,	  the	  direct	  
measurement	  of	  its	  key	  concept	  –	  cognitive	  load	  itself	  –	  remains	  elusive.	  Much	  research	  on	  
learning	  with	  digital	  technologies	  routinely	  uses	  cognitive	  load	  to	  explain	  individual	  
differences	  in	  learning	  outcomes	  but	  does	  not	  directly	  measure	  the	  actual	  cognitive	  load	  
experienced	  by	  learners	  (Brünken,	  Steinbacher,	  Plass,	  &	  Leutner,	  2002).	  This	  is	  not	  because	  
of	  any	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  obtaining	  such	  measures	  from	  the	  research	  community	  but	  is	  
attributable	  to	  a	  number	  of	  deep-­‐rooted	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  issues	  that	  make	  achieving	  
reliable	  and	  valid	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  challenging.	  
	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  its	  widespread	  adoption,	  research	  and	  interest	  in	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  
ranges	  across	  many	  disciplines	  and	  contexts,	  and	  locating	  relevant	  scholarly	  studies	  
therefore	  involves	  searching	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  sources	  for	  appropriate	  material.	  The	  focus	  of	  
the	  present	  study	  was	  on	  empirical	  work	  where	  the	  measurement	  of	  cognitive	  load	  or	  
critiques	  of	  such	  measurement	  or	  of	  the	  instrumentation	  used	  or	  available	  to	  conduct	  such	  
measurements	  was	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  work.	  The	  use	  of	  a	  systematic	  review	  was	  
therefore	  selected	  as	  this	  method	  uses	  a	  well-­‐defined	  and	  rigorous	  approach	  that	  attempts	  
to	  identify,	  appraise,	  and	  synthesise	  all	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  meets	  pre-­‐specified	  
eligibility	  criteria	  to	  answer	  a	  given	  research	  question.	  The	  use	  of	  this	  explicit	  method	  aims	  at	  
minimising	  bias,	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  more	  reliable	  findings	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  inform	  
decision	  making	  and	  future	  research	  (Davies,	  2000;	  Gough,	  Oliver,	  &	  Thomas,	  2013;	  Higgins	  
&	  Green,	  2011).	  
	  
Key	  steps	  in	  a	  systematic	  review	  include	  the	  identification	  of	  relevant	  studies	  from	  a	  
number	  of	  different	  sources,	  selecting	  studies	  for	  inclusion	  and	  conducting	  an	  evaluation	  
of	  their	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  clear,	  predefined	  criteria	  followed	  by	  the	  
systematic	  collection	  and	  appropriate	  synthesis	  of	  data.	  The	  research	  question	  was	  Under	  
what	  circumstances	  and	  with	  what	  instruments	  can	  cognitive	  load	  be	  measured	  in	  valid	  
and	  reliable	  ways?	  The	  minimum	  selection	  requirements	  for	  inclusion	  of	  material	  were	  
therefore	  about	  fitness	  for	  purpose	  and	  whether	  the	  material	  included	  empirical	  work	  and	  
the	  conducting	  or	  critique	  of	  measurements	  of	  cognitive	  load	  or	  of	  the	  instrumentation	  
used	  to	  conduct	  such	  measures.	  For	  potential	  inclusion,	  sources	  also	  had	  to	  include	  
content	  on	  measuring	  cognitive	  load	  in	  reliable	  and	  valid	  ways,	  ideally	  that	  are	  therefore	  
potentially	  transferrable	  across	  knowledge	  domains.	  The	  review	  was	  also	  on	  locating	  
relatively	  recent	  academic	  articles	  that	  were	  substantially	  about	  instruments	  or	  techniques	  
that	  reported	  some	  success	  in	  achieving	  this,	  particularly	  if	  they	  gave	  detail	  or	  analysis	  of	  the	  
metrics	  obtained,	  as	  discussed	  above.	  Because	  of	  the	  subject	  range	  of	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  
in	  the	  research	  literature,	  a	  total	  of	  52	  major	  academic	  databases	  were	  therefore	  searched	  






The	  search	  variables	  employed	  were	  cognitive	  load	  and	  all	  derivatives	  of	  “measure”	  
including	  measure,	  measuring,	  measurement,	  measures,	  and	  so	  forth.	  As	  the	  review	  was	  
mainly	  focussed	  on	  activity	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  search	  included	  only	  items	  where	  the	  
full	  text	  was	  available	  online	  and	  that	  were	  published	  from	  January	  2004	  onwards.	  The	  
search	  located	  a	  total	  of	  10,796	  items	  including	  books	  or	  eBooks	  (415),	  book	  chapters	  (124),	  
conference	  proceedings	  (1,008),	  dissertations	  and	  theses	  (234),	  journal	  articles	  (8,719),	  
papers	  (1),	  reference	  texts	  (8),	  and	  reports	  (11).	  Material	  from	  unpublished	  dissertations,	  
conference	  papers,	  or	  technical	  reports	  was	  not	  included	  as	  their	  selective	  availability	  
seemed	  likely	  to	  bias	  the	  systematic	  review.	  
	  
Two-­‐hundred-­‐and-­‐seventy-­‐six	  items	  were	  excluded	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  academic	  unsuitability	  
or	  quality,	  for	  failing	  to	  meet	  the	  minimum	  requirements	  for	  inclusion,	  and/or	  where	  
there	  was	  little	  or	  no	  information	  about	  the	  instrumentation	  that	  was	  used;	  these	  tended	  to	  
be	  “overview”	  or	  promotional	  pieces	  with	  relatively	  little	  detail	  and	  comprised	  book	  reviews	  
(42),	  magazine	  articles	  (66),	  newsletters	  (53),	  newspaper	  articles	  (114),	  and	  one	  trade	  
publication.	  The	  remaining	  10,520	  relevant	  sources	  were	  then	  filtered	  for	  scholarly	  peer-­‐
reviewed	  publications	  only	  where	  academic	  critique	  was	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  any	  claims	  
made	  for	  validity,	  reliability,	  or	  the	  replicability	  of	  the	  outcomes	  that	  were	  claimed	  for	  the	  
measurement	  approaches	  described,	  which	  reduced	  the	  total	  of	  relevant	  items	  to	  7,097	  
articles.	  Each	  of	  these	  shortlisted	  articles	  was	  reviewed	  manually	  for	  suitability	  of	  focus	  
within	  title,	  abstract	  and/or	  keywords,	  and	  concluding	  sections,	  and	  this	  process	  identified	  
136	  articles,	  each	  of	  which	  was	  read	  in	  its	  entirety.	  
	  
Current	  models	  of	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  are	  based	  upon	  the	  earlier	  work	  of	  schema	  theory	  
(Anderson,	  1983),	  dual-­‐coding	  theory	  (Paivio,	  1986),	  working	  memory	  models	  (Baddeley,	  
1986),	  and	  generative	  theory	  (Wittrock,	  1974).	  Early	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  emerged	  
from	  item	  difficulty	  tests	  (Bratfisch,	  Borg,	  &	  Dornic,	  1972),	  but	  these	  were	  limited	  by	  their	  
subjectivity	  (Paas	  &	  Van	  Merriënboer,	  1994).	  This	  earlier	  work	  was	  subsequently	  integrated	  
into	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  developed	  by	  Sweller	  (1999)	  and	  incorporated	  within	  Mayer’s	  
theory	  of	  multimedia	  learning	  (Mayer,	  2001).	  
	  
Cognitive	  load	  theory	  seeks	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  some	  material	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  
learn	  than	  other	  material	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  human	  brain	  uses	  two	  
types	  of	  memory:	  short-­‐term	  (working)	  and	  long-­‐term	  (storage)	  memory,	  where	  short-­‐term	  
memory	  is	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  limited	  capacity,	  perhaps	  for	  as	  few	  as	  four	  “chunks”	  of	  
information	  (Halford,	  Baker,	  McCredden,	  &	  Bain,	  2005)	  and	  long-­‐term	  memory	  is	  seen	  as	  
having	  almost	  unlimited	  capacity	  (Sweller,	  1994).	  Working	  memory	  is	  commonly	  
defined	  as	  “a	  brain	  system	  that	  provides	  temporary	  storage	  and	  manipulation	  of	  the	  
information	  necessary	  for	  such	  complex	  cognitive	  tasks	  as	  language	  comprehension,	  
learning,	  and	  reasoning”	  (Baddeley,	  1992,	  p.	  556).	  Working	  memory	  therefore	  represents	  a	  
limit	  on	  learning	  in	  terms	  of	  storage	  and	  working	  space	  for	  conscious	  cognition.Working	  
memory	  is	  thought	  by	  some	  to	  be	  fixed	  genetically,	  to	  grow	  with	  age	  (Miller,	  1956)	  and	  to	  
limit	  our“thinking-­‐holding	  space”	  (Johnstone,	  1997)	  when	  processing	  or	  holding	  information	  
because	  the	  more	  information	  that	  has	  to	  be	  held	  the	  less	  space	  there	  is	  for	  processing.	  
In	  terms	  of	  developing	  greater	  understanding,	  learning	  therefore	  ceases	  when	  working	  
memory	  becomes	  overwhelmed	  by	  too	  much	  information	  and	  processing	  (Reid,	  2008).	  
Cowan	  (2000)	  argues	  from	  an	  extensive	  review	  of	  research	  and	  theory	  that	  different	  
underlying	  forms	  of	  memory	  representation	  all	  indicate	  similar	  capacity	  estimates	  for	  
working	  memory.	  Although	  at	  any	  one	  time	  different	  memory	  chunks	  may	  be	  less	  or	  more	  
prominent	  in	  memory	  representation,	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  attention	  will	  determine	  how	  many	  
of	  the	  most	  prominent	  chunks	  in	  the	  representation	  we	  can	  attend	  to	  at	  once,	  and	  four	  
chunks	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  functional	  limit	  for	  optimal	  processing.	  
	  
The	  existence	  of	  long-­‐	  and	  short-­‐term	  types	  of	  memory	  in	  humans	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  
important	  because	  it	  significantly	  influences	  the	  way	  we	  learn.	  Using	  short-­‐term	  memory,	  
we	  develop	  schemas	  (“cognitive	  constructs	  that	  incorporate	  multiple	  elements	  of	  
information	  into	  a	  single	  element	  with	  a	  specific	  function”	  –	  Paas,	  Renkel,	  &	  Sweller,	  2003,	  
p.	  2)	  and	  store	  these	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  Schemas	  help	  us	  when	  solving	  problems	  that	  
we	  have	  not	  seen	  before	  by	  drawing	  on	  our	  learning	  about	  similar	  kinds	  of	  problems	  we	  
have	  solved	  in	  the	  past	  and	  thereby	  speeding	  up	  problem	  solving	  and	  task	  execution	  by	  
partially	  automating	  our	  cognitive	  activity	  when	  responding	  to	  situations	  or	  problems	  that	  
are	  similar	  to	  ones	  we	  have	  learned	  about	  in	  the	  past	  “by	  chunking	  individual	  elements	  into	  
a	  single	  element”	  (Sweller,	  1994,	  p.	  299).	  We	  use	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  short-­‐term	  memory	  
to	  manipulate	  existing	  schemas	  (or	  to	  create	  new	  ones)	  and	  apply	  these	  to	  solving	  problems	  
that	  would	  otherwise	  prove	  too	  complex	  for	  us	  to	  deal	  with	  if	  we	  always	  had	  to	  begin	  from	  
first	  principles.	  
	  
Baddeley’s	  widely	  used	  model	  of	  working	  memory	  assumes	  that	  a	  central	  executive	  
exists	  in	  the	  human	  brain	  and	  that	  this	  coordinates	  two	  other	  interconnected	  but	  separate	  
and	  independent	  systems,	  one	  auditory	  system	  that	  processes	  information	  such	  as	  music	  
or	  spoken	  material	  –	  the	  phonological	  loop	  –	  and	  a	  second	  system	  that	  processes	  written	  
material	  or	  pictures	  –	  the	  visuospatial	  sketchpad	  (Baddeley,	  1986;	  Baddeley	  &	  Logie,	  
1999;	  Repovš	  &	  Baddeley,	  2006).	  This	  dual-­‐coding	  assumption	  was	  originally	  taken	  
from	  dual-­‐coding	  theory	  (Paivio,	  1986).	  The	  phonological	  loop	  and	  the	  visuospatial	  
sketchpad	  are	  thought	  of	  as	  slave	  systems	  and	  are	  presumed	  to	  have	  limited	  capacity	  and	  by	  
virtue	  of	  being	  independent	  from	  each	  other	  are	  unable	  to	  compensate	  for	  lack	  of	  capacity	  
in	  the	  other.	  If	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  learning	  experience	  the	  processing	  ability	  of	  either	  the	  
visuospatial	  sketchpad	  or	  the	  phonological	  loop	  approaches	  zero,	  the	  learner	  experiences	  
high	  cognitive	  load.	  The	  amount	  of	  this	  difference	  between	  the	  total	  cognitive	  load	  and	  the	  
processing	  capacity	  of	  the	  auditory	  or	  visual	  system	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  free	  cognitive	  resource	  of	  
the	  learner,	  and	  this	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  create	  one	  direct	  measure	  of	  cognitive	  load	  
(Brünken	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  In	  an	  alternative	  proposal,	  Barrouillet	  and	  Verbal	  proposed	  a	  
resource-­‐sharing	  model	  for	  working	  memory	  which	  includes	  a	  time-­‐based	  feature	  that	  
assumes	  that	  rapid	  switching	  occurs	  during	  processing	  (Barrouillet	  &	  Verbal,	  2004;	  
Barrouillet,	  Bernardin,	  Portrat,	  Vergauwe,	  &	  Camos,	  2007).	  According	  to	  the	  time-­‐based	  
resource-­‐sharing	  model,	  the	  cognitive	  load	  generated	  by	  any	  given	  task	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  proportion	  of	  time	  during	  which	  it	  captures	  attention,	  during	  which	  it	  impedes	  other	  
attention-­‐demanding	  processes,	  and	  information	  in	  working	  memory	  is	  therefore	  likely	  to	  
decay	  rapidly	  as	  soon	  as	  attention	  is	  captured	  by	  another	  activity	  (Barrouillet	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
	  
These	  and	  other	  theoretical	  models	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  phonological	  loop	  and	  the	  
visuospatial	  sketchpad	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  research,	  not	  least	  because	  the	  actual	  
amount	  of	  cognitive	  load	  that	  is	  created	  within	  these	  systems	  has	  proved	  difficult	  to	  
measure	  directly.	  Further,	  some	  have	  suggested	  that	  individuals	  with	  higher	  visuospatial	  
working	  memory	  capacity	  are	  affected	  differently	  by	  verbal	  working	  memory	  load	  than	  
those	  with	  lower	  capacity,	  suggesting	  that	  capacity	  in	  one	  may	  affect	  that	  in	  the	  other	  
(Ross	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  However,	  research	  on	  cognitive	  load	  routinely	  uses	  this	  theoretical	  
rationale	  to	  explain	  different	  learning	  outcomes	  for	  individuals	  using	  multimedia	  or	  
webbased	  learning	  resources	  (e.g.,	  Brünken	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
	  
Cognitive	  load	  theory	  argues	  that	  whether	  particular	  material	  is	  easy	  or	  difficult	  to	  learn	  
depends	  in	  large	  part	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  manage	  the	  amount	  of	  
processing	  (cognitive	  load)	  needed	  to	  solve	  a	  problem	  or	  learn	  something	  new	  by	  using	  
schema	  acquisition	  and	  automation.	  Cognitive	  load	  theory	  proposes	  that	  three	  different	  
kinds	  of	  cognitive	  load	  operate.	  Extraneous	  cognitive	  load	  is	  the	  difficulty	  associated	  with	  the	  
design	  of	  instructional	  material,	  especially	  the	  way	  information	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  learner.	  
High	  extraneous	  cognitive	  load	  inhibits	  learning	  because	  of	  unnecessary	  processing	  caused	  
by	  the	  instructional	  design.	  Germane	  cognitive	  load	  is	  the	  load	  created	  by	  constructing,	  
processing,	  and	  automating	  schemas	  (and	  can	  also	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  instructional	  
design)	  but	  is	  helpful	  to	  learning	  because	  it	  results	  from	  features	  of	  the	  design	  that	  direct	  
attention	  towards	  relevant	  learning	  processes.	  Intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  is	  attributable	  to	  
the	  inherent	  complexity	  or	  difficulty	  of	  the	  material	  to	  be	  learned;	  this	  cannot	  be	  
changed	  by	  the	  teacher,	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  unaffected	  by	  the	  instructional	  design,	  and	  is	  
thought	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  learner’s	  prior	  knowledge	  and	  the	  
intrinsic	  complexity	  of	  the	  learning	  material	  (Sweller	  &	  Chandler,	  1994).	  
	  
Cognitive	  load	  theory	  proposes	  a	  mechanism	  whereby	  learner	  engagement	  in	  cognitive	  
tasks	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  neurophysiological	  terms,	  with	  some	  suggesting	  that	  the	  core	  
mechanisms	  of	  working	  memory	  are	  settled	  as	  early	  as	  during	  childhood	  (see	  Portrat,	  
Camos,	  &	  Barrouillet,	  2009).	  However,	  overall	  mental	  performance	  is	  a	  multidimensional	  
construct,	  and	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  does	  not	  take	  account	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  
individual	  goals,	  expectations,	  or	  beliefs	  on	  cognitive	  performance	  (Moreno,	  2006;	  Moreno	  
&	  Park,	  2010).	  To	  achieve	  this	  would	  require	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  theoretical	  underpinning	  
of	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  to	  link	  it	  more	  closely	  to	  such	  individual	  differences	  and	  to	  
take	  individual	  motivation	  and	  development	  of	  expertise	  during	  courses	  of	  study	  or	  training	  
into	  account	  and	  to	  flexibly	  adapt	  instruction	  by	  better	  assessment	  of	  a	  learner’s	  expertise	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  performance	  (Van	  Merriënboer	  &	  Sweller,	  2005).	  
	  
Researchers	  in	  the	  field	  of	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  seek	  to	  arrange	  the	  instructional	  control	  
of	  cognitive	  load	  so	  as	  to	  optimise	  the	  load	  experienced	  by	  subjects	  in	  learning	  situations	  to	  
avoid	  extreme	  situations	  where	  there	  is	  too	  little	  load	  or	  too	  much	  load,	  because	  learning	  
deteriorates	  in	  both	  situations	  (Ayres	  &	  van	  Gog,	  2009;	  Young	  &	  Stanton,	  2002).	  Cognitive	  
load	  researchers	  wish	  to	  produce	  both	  the	  optimum	  amount	  of	  load	  for	  learning	  and	  to	  
promote	  load	  of	  the	  most	  helpful	  sort;	  that	  is,	  they	  seek	  to	  optimise	  the	  load	  that	  
contributes	  to	  learning	  (i.e.,	  germane	  load)	  and	  reduce	  the	  load	  imposed	  by	  elements	  that	  
hamper	  learning	  (i.e.,	  extraneous	  load).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  separate	  and	  measure	  
the	  three	  types	  of	  cognitive	  load	  because	  each	  of	  them	  is	  related	  to	  learning	  in	  different	  
ways,	  but	  studies	  have	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  empirically	  distinguish	  between	  their	  separate	  
effects	  in	  a	  learning	  context	  (Brünken,	  Seufert,	  &	  Paas,	  2010).	  
	  
For	  example,	  when	  learners	  find	  instructional	  tasks	  easy	  (where	  intrinsic	  load	  is	  low),	  
any	  extraneous	  cognitive	  load	  imposed	  by	  the	  learning	  resources	  or	  context	  may	  have	  little	  
or	  no	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  learning.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  when	  tasks	  are	  more	  
difficult	  and	  the	  intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  is	  high,	  and	  under	  these	  circumstances	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  take	  appropriate	  account	  of	  the	  extraneous	  load	  on	  learners	  (Van	  Merriënboer	  &	  
Sweller,	  2005).	  However,	  in	  some	  learning	  situations	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  reduce	  the	  
intrinsic	  load	  because	  the	  learning	  tasks	  may	  be	  unavoidably	  complex,	  they	  may	  have	  
irreducible	  high	  element	  interactivity,	  or	  may	  require	  the	  use	  of	  many	  different	  schemas,	  
such	  as	  in	  situations	  where	  multiple	  choices	  are	  available	  to	  the	  learner	  regarding	  the	  
information	  to	  be	  selected	  and	  applied.	  Research	  using	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  has	  therefore	  
sought	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  manage	  high	  intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  (Pollock,	  Chandler,	  &	  Sweller,	  
2002)	  by	  approaches	  that	  measure	  and	  compensate	  for	  learner’s	  prior	  knowledge	  (see	  
Kalyuga,	  Ayres,	  Chandler,	  &	  Sweller,	  2003)	  or	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  level	  of	  germane	  load	  
imposed	  on	  learners	  by	  different	  instructional	  materials	  (Cierniak	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Kalyuga,	  
Chandler,	  &	  Sweller,	  1998;	  Salomon,	  1984).	  
	  
As	  part	  of	  this	  approach,	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  physical	  integration	  
of	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information	  is	  generally	  beneficial	  for	  learners.	  Physical	  integration	  
happens	  when,	  for	  example,	  text	  and	  images	  are	  combined	  in	  multimedia	  applications	  or	  on	  
the	  page	  of	  a	  textbook	  so	  that	  each	  does	  not	  simply	  replicate	  the	  content	  contained	  in	  the	  
other.	  Physical	  integration	  reduces	  the	  need	  for	  learners	  to	  split	  their	  attention	  between	  
(for	  example)	  separate	  illustrations	  and	  text	  on	  a	  page	  or	  screen,	  otherwise	  the	  learner’s	  
attention	  may	  be	  divided	  unhelpfully	  between	  the	  separate	  elements,	  as	  they	  attempt	  to	  
process	  each	  one	  individually	  and	  make	  cognitive	  associations	  between	  them.	  This	  split	  
attention	  effect	  is	  regarded	  as	  unhelpful	  for	  learning	  because	  it	  increases	  extraneous	  load	  
and	  so	  learning	  materials	  featuring	  split-­‐attention	  may	  overwhelm	  working	  memory	  
capacity	  (Chandler	  &	  Sweller,	  1992;	  Eilam	  &	  Poyas,	  2008;	  Sweller,	  1994).	  Educationalists	  
using	  or	  designing	  multimedia	  or	  other	  technology-­‐enhanced	  or	  e-­‐learning	  resources	  would	  
therefore	  need	  to	  guard	  against	  inadvertently	  provoking	  the	  split-­‐attention	  effect	  in	  any	  
resources	  they	  offered	  to	  students.	  
	  
However,	  subsequent	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  in	  any	  given	  subject	  domain,	  certain	  
learning	  resources	  which	  are	  beneficial	  for	  less	  expert	  learners	  can	  be	  disadvantageous	  as	  
learners	  become	  more	  expert	  (Kalyuga	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  In	  particular,	  the	  physical	  integration	  
of	  information	  as	  a	  means	  to	  minimise	  the	  split-­‐attention	  effect	  becomes	  less	  helpful	  to	  
learners	  as	  their	  expertise	  grows	  and	  it	  becomes	  counter-­‐productive	  for	  learning	  as	  expertise	  
increases	  still	  further	  (Kalyuga	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  For	  more	  expert	  learners,	  the	  physical	  separation	  
of	  information	  can	  be	  more	  advantageous	  than	  its	  integration,	  because	  they	  are	  likely	  
to	  already	  possess	  the	  schema	  that	  the	  learning	  resources	  are	  attempting	  to	  promote	  in	  less	  
experienced	  learners.	  As	  a	  result,	  learning	  resources	  may	  become	  subject,	  therefore,	  to	  an	  
expertise-­‐reversal	  effect	  (Schnotz,	  2010).	  The	  expertise-­‐reversal	  effect	  appears	  when	  more	  
expert	  learners	  find	  it	  easier	  to	  handle	  complex	  instructional	  material	  but	  more	  difficult	  to	  
learn	  from	  material	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  integrate	  separate	  elements	  in	  order	  to	  aid	  less	  
experienced	  learners	  to	  construct	  appropriate	  mental	  representations	  (schemas).	  In	  such	  
cases,	  experienced	  learners	  are	  confronted	  with	  instructional	  guidance	  that	  is	  redundant	  for	  
them,	  and	  this	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  ignore,	  thus	  increasing	  cognitive	  load	  and	  reducing	  the	  
efficiency	  of	  their	  learning	  (Kalyuga	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  can	  therefore	  
only	  be	  meaningfully	  measured	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  level	  of	  expertise	  (Schnotz	  
&	  Kürschner,	  2007).	  This	  could	  pose	  particular	  problems	  for	  educators	  wishing	  to	  avoid	  
the	  expertise-­‐reversal	  effect	  if	  they	  did	  not	  have	  reliable	  information	  about	  the	  expertise	  
level	  of	  each	  learner	  in	  any	  given	  subject	  domain.	  
	  
Obtaining	  valid	  and	  reliable	  measures	  of	  individual	  cognitive	  load	  from	  learners	  can	  be	  
problematic	  for	  other	  reasons	  also,	  not	  least	  because	  learners	  faced	  with	  a	  new	  topic	  or	  
domain	  may	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  report	  whether	  any	  difficulty	  they	  experience	  is	  due	  more	  to	  
the	  content	  or	  to	  the	  instructional	  design.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  
reliably	  identify	  and	  disentangle	  the	  origins	  of	  extraneous	  and	  intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  
(Cierniak	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  either	  one	  or	  another	  type	  of	  cognitive	  load	  being	  higher	  
or	  lower	  for	  different	  learners,	  the	  overall	  load	  for	  different	  learners	  may	  be	  very	  similar	  but	  
we	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  know	  the	  source	  from	  which	  the	  load	  originates.	  Different	  measures	  
of	  cognitive	  load	  should	  therefore	  not	  be	  assumed	  to	  measure	  overall	  cognitive	  load,	  but	  it	  
may	  be	  possible	  to	  use	  them	  to	  measure	  different	  types	  of	  load.	  Different	  learning	  materials	  
(or	  learner	  characteristics)	  may	  produce	  different	  patterns	  of	  results	  that	  also	  might	  depend	  
upon	  the	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  learner	  (Kalyuga	  &	  Sweller,	  2005).	  
	  
Because	  intrinsic	  load	  varies	  not	  just	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  inherent	  complexity	  of	  the	  learning	  
material	  but	  also	  with	  the	  expertise	  of	  the	  individual	  learner	  in	  a	  given	  subject	  or	  content	  
area,	  establishing	  the	  intrinsic	  load	  for	  individual	  learners	  is	  important	  for	  maximising	  their	  
learning.	  This	  is	  not	  straightforward	  because	  the	  measurement	  of	  intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  
often	  relies	  on	  subjective	  or	  objective	  measurement	  instruments	  that	  have	  significant	  
structural	  limitations.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  with	  subjective	  instruments	  in	  general,	  for	  
example,	  such	  as	  self-­‐report	  questionnaires,	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  
espoused	  theory	  and	  theory	  in	  use	  (Argyris,	  1976),	  which	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  
individuals	  say	  they	  do	  and	  what	  they	  actually	  do.	  A	  learner	  might	  employ	  entirely	  different	  
strategies	  (or	  experience	  entirely	  different	  difficulties)	  in	  practice	  from	  those	  they	  
consistently	  report	  in	  good	  faith	  on	  questionnaires	  or	  during	  interview.	  
	  
The	  value	  of	  using	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  cognitive	  effort	  to	  measure	  cognitive	  load	  
is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  make	  reliable	  and	  valid	  estimates	  of	  
the	  amount	  of	  cognitive	  effort	  they	  are	  expending	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  This	  approach	  has	  the	  
great	  benefit	  of	  simplicity	  but	  has	  the	  significant	  drawback	  that	  it	  usually	  involves	  singlepoint	  
post-­‐hoc	  assessments	  with	  questionable	  content	  validity.	  It	  is	  also	  difficult	  to	  be	  sure	  
that	  retrospective	  assessments	  are	  accurate	  assessments	  of	  the	  cognitive	  load	  expended	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  what	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  assessments	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  task),	  or	  to	  which	  type	  
of	  load	  an	  individual	  assessment	  relates,	  or	  which	  type	  of	  load	  created	  the	  perceived	  effort,	  
or	  to	  know	  how	  the	  assessment	  can	  be	  related	  directly	  to	  learning.	  Additionally,	  subjective	  
measures	  are	  frequently	  administered	  post-­‐hoc	  and	  may	  therefore	  be	  mediated	  by	  faulty	  
recollection	  or	  rationalisation,	  or	  during	  activity	  breaks	  which	  may	  disrupt	  the	  activity	  
being	  investigated,	  and	  subjective	  methods	  have	  on	  these	  grounds	  been	  criticised	  as	  
suffering	  from	  low	  evaluative	  bandwidth	  (Lin,	  Li,Wu,	  &	  Tang,	  2013).	  Despite	  these	  
reservations,	  some	  studies	  have	  argued	  in	  favour	  of	  self-­‐rating	  instruments	  on	  the	  grounds	  
that	  participants	  have	  been	  able	  to	  detect	  differences	  in	  task	  complexity	  and	  have	  suggested	  
that	  subjective	  measures	  may	  therefore	  in	  practice	  be	  sensitive	  to	  intrinsic	  cognitive	  load,	  be	  
highly	  reliable,	  and	  also	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  being	  relatively	  unobtrusive	  (see	  Ayres,	  2006).	  
	  
This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  some	  studies	  interested	  in	  quantifying	  and	  evaluating	  cognitive	  
load	  in	  high	  frequency	  interaction	  scenarios,	  such	  as	  found	  in	  air-­‐traffic	  control.	  In	  one	  
such	  study	  where	  task	  difficulty	  was	  mediated	  using	  the	  number	  and	  incoming	  direction	  
of	  aircraft,	  participants	  were	  judged	  to	  be	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  three	  types	  of	  
cognitive	  load	  with	  over	  74%	  accuracy	  (Lin	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
	  
Limitations	  also	  exist	  for	  other	  instruments	  proposed	  for	  measuring	  cognitive	  load	  
especially	  when	  this	  varies	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  learner’s	  changing	  framework	  of	  reference	  
and	  increased	  schema	  acquisition	  in	  response	  to	  progressive	  learning	  (i.e.,	  as	  learner	  
expertise	  increases),	  because	  the	  difficulties	  that	  are	  perceived	  by	  the	  learner	  and	  the	  
associated	  degree	  of	  helpfulness	  of	  particular	  resources	  may	  be	  continuously	  changing	  as	  
learning	  proceeds	  (Schnotz	  &	  Kürschner,	  2007;	  Veenman,	  Prins,	  &	  Verheij,	  2003).	  However,	  
work	  comparing	  different	  approaches	  for	  establishing	  item	  difficulty	  levels	  has	  shown	  that	  
individual	  learners	  do	  perform	  quite	  well	  when	  judging	  the	  difficulty	  level	  of	  items	  and	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  more	  accurate	  than	  subject	  experts	  at	  establishing	  the	  “true”	  level	  of	  difficulty;	  
that	  is,	  the	  level	  established	  from	  a	  large	  sample	  size	  (Wauters,	  Desmet,	  &	  Van	  Den	  
Noortgate,	  2012).	  Using	  student	  evaluations	  of	  item	  difficulty	  levels	  to	  help	  guide	  a	  
determination	  of	  the	  subject	  expertise	  of	  a	  particular	  learner	  may	  therefore	  in	  practice	  be	  an	  
effective	  way	  to	  match	  different	  instructional	  material	  to	  a	  learner’s	  developing	  mastery	  of	  
content.	  
	  
Measurement	  of	  cognitive	  load	  In	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  development	  of	  cognitive	  load	  
theory,	  measurement	  was	  undertaken	  mainly	  by	  indirect	  methods	  such	  as	  learner	  error	  
rates,	  the	  time	  taken	  to	  reach	  problem	  solutions,	  or	  computational	  models	  that	  were	  often	  
used	  alongside	  more	  established	  approaches	  such	  as	  dual-­‐task	  methodology	  (Dutke	  &	  Rinck,	  
2006;	  Sweller,	  1988).	  
	  
These	  approaches	  have	  been	  largely	  superseded	  by	  self-­‐rating	  Likert-­‐scale	  measures	  
where	  learners	  are	  asked	  to	  report	  the	  perceived	  amount	  of	  mental	  effort	  they	  invest	  in	  a	  
learning	  experience	  (Paas,	  1992),	  where	  mental	  effort	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  aspect	  of	  cognitive	  
load	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  cognitive	  capacity	  that	  is	  actually	  allocated	  to	  accommodate	  the	  
demands	  imposed	  by	  the	  task;	  thus,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  reflect	  the	  actual	  cognitive	  
load”	  (Paas,	  Tuovinen,	  Tabbers,	  &	  Van	  Gerven,	  2003,	  p.	  64).	  In	  order	  to	  explore	  more	  
fully	  the	  different	  cognitive	  process	  within	  such	  global	  measures,	  a	  set	  of	  separate	  (but	  
still	  subjective)	  scale	  items	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  measure	  intrinsic,	  extraneous,	  and	  
germane	  cognitive	  load	  individually	  (Cierniak	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
	  
Other	  measures	  have	  sought	  to	  assess	  the	  efficiency	  (quality)	  of	  learning	  by	  mapping	  
the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mental	  effort	  invested	  and	  test	  performance	  (Paas	  &	  Van	  
Merriënboer,	  1993)	  or	  between	  the	  time	  invested	  and	  test	  performance	  (Gerjets,	  Scheiter,	  &	  
Cierniak,	  2009;	  Van	  Gog	  &	  Paas,	  2008).	  Although	  still	  widely	  used,	  self-­‐rating	  Likertscale	  
measures	  have	  also	  attracted	  criticism	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  may	  be	  too	  subjective	  
(Brünken	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  or	  because	  they	  have	  been	  too	  often	  used	  to	  measure	  different	  types	  
of	  cognitive	  load	  inappropriately	  (Kirschner,	  Ayres,	  &	  Chandler,	  2011),	  and	  because	  they	  
have	  not	  always	  been	  used	  in	  a	  consistent	  way	  (Van	  Gog	  &	  Paas,	  2008).	  Some	  writers	  argue	  
that	  these	  different	  measurement	  approaches	  towards	  cognitive	  load	  have	  actually	  been	  
assessing	  different	  constructs	  and	  therefore	  are	  not	  equivalent	  or	  necessarily	  comparable	  
(e.g.,	  Ayres	  &	  Paas,	  2012;	  Ayres	  &	  Van	  Gog,	  2009).	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  review,	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  mental	  workload	  metrics	  have	  
been	  divided	  into	  the	  three	  broad	  but	  somewhat	  overlapping	  categories	  of	  subjective	  
measures,	  physiological	  measures	  (direct	  objective),	  and	  secondary-­‐task	  (indirect	  objective)	  
approaches.	  However,	  the	  specific	  techniques	  used	  in	  each	  case	  may	  be	  accessing	  slightly	  
different	  features	  of	  mental	  workload,	  and	  in	  practice	  there	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  some	  value	  in	  
using	  multiple	  measures,	  preferably	  from	  two	  or	  more	  of	  the	  broad	  categories	  shown	  in	  




Subjective	  approaches	  most	  commonly	  use	  participant	  ratings	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  
materials	  to	  be	  learnt	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  cognitive	  load	  (Kalyuga,	  Chandler,	  &	  Sweller,	  
1998),	  although	  differences	  in	  ratings	  between	  participants	  can	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  
difficulty	  of	  the	  task,	  the	  differing	  expertise	  or	  competency	  of	  individual	  participants,	  or	  
other	  factors	  such	  as	  variations	  in	  participants’	  motivational	  levels	  or	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  
concentrate.	  
Indirect	  subjective	  measures	  include	  self-­‐reports	  of	  stress	  or	  the	  mental	  effort	  expended	  
and	  commonly	  rely	  on	  the	  retrospective	  use	  of	  Likert-­‐type	  scales	  or	  on	  data	  collected	  during	  
task	  performance	  (e.g.,	  Antonenko	  &	  Neiderhauser,	  2010;	  Ayres,	  2006;	  Chang	  &	  Yang,	  
2010;	  Kalyuga	  &	  Sweller,	  2005;	  Scharfenberg	  &	  Bogner,	  2013).	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  
how	  these	  self-­‐reports	  can	  be	  related	  directly	  to	  the	  actual	  cognitive	  load	  involved	  
(Brünken	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  This	  issue	  is	  problematic	  for	  many	  other	  approaches	  to	  measuring	  
cognitive	  load,	  where	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  mental	  effort	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  
learning	  task	  generated	  a	  small	  cognitive	  load	  (it	  was	  an	  easy	  task),	  or	  that	  the	  task	  was	  
difficult	  but	  the	  learner	  possessed	  high	  expertise	  (the	  learner	  found	  the	  task	  easy	  because	  of	  
their	  high	  degree	  of	  competence),	  or	  it	  could	  equally	  indicate	  that	  the	  cognitive	  load	  
demanded	  was	  so	  high	  that	  the	  learner	  gave	  up	  trying	  to	  understand	  or	  complete	  the	  task	  
(irrespective	  of	  their	  level	  of	  expertise).	  These	  “efficiency”	  measures	  are	  problematic	  when	  
some	  individuals	  reach	  similar	  levels	  of	  performance	  than	  others	  with	  less	  mental	  effort	  or	  
where	  higher	  levels	  of	  performance	  than	  others	  are	  attained	  with	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  
invested	  effort.	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  relationship	  between	  self-­‐report	  values	  and	  the	  
experienced	  cognitive	  load	  means	  something	  different	  and	  should	  be	  interpreted	  differently.	  	  
	  
Correlations	  between	  self-­‐report	  scales,	  secondary	  visual	  monitoring	  tasks,	  and	  post-­‐hoc	  
difficulty	  rating	  scales	  are	  not	  reliable	  or	  consistent	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  weak,	  and	  different	  types	  
of	  cognitive	  load	  are	  often	  dissociated	  from	  each	  other,	  are	  not	  highly	  correlated,	  and	  can	  
be	  sensitive	  to	  different	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load,	  such	  as	  reaction	  times	  to	  secondary	  
tasks,	  effort	  ratings	  during	  learning,	  and	  difficulty	  ratings	  after	  learning	  (DeLeeuw	  &	  
Mayer,	  2008).	  
	  
If	  cognitive	  load	  is	  influenced	  by	  or	  composed	  of	  different	  elements	  as	  suggested	  
(Mayer,	  2001;	  Sweller,	  1999),	  different	  manipulations	  in	  the	  learning	  situation	  would	  
seem	  likely	  to	  cause	  different	  types	  of	  cognitive	  load	  to	  vary.	  It	  may	  therefore	  be	  dangerous	  
to	  assume	  that	  different	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  each	  measure	  overall	  cognitive	  load,	  but	  
it	  may	  be	  that	  these	  may	  be	  used	  to	  measure	  different	  types	  of	  load.	  Different	  learning	  
materials	  (or	  learner	  characteristics)	  may	  also	  produce	  different	  patterns	  of	  results	  which	  
might	  depend	  on	  the	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  learner	  (Kalyuga	  &	  Sweller,	  2005).	  
	  
These	  and	  similar	  complexities	  undermine	  any	  assumed	  linear	  relationship	  between	  
performance	  and	  mental	  effort,	  especially	  when	  we	  additionally	  allow	  for	  differences	  
between	  individuals	  with	  regard	  to	  interest	  in	  a	  given	  learning	  topic	  or	  levels	  of	  motivation,	  
as	  these	  also	  seem	  likely	  to	  influence	  an	  individual’s	  investment	  of	  mental	  effort.	  Higher	  task	  
demands	  are	  not	  necessarily	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  mental	  workload	  because,	  as	  we	  
have	  seen,	  mental	  workload	  cannot	  be	  precisely	  measured	  using	  only	  the	  properties	  of	  
the	  task	  itself.	  Other,	  individual,	  factors	  such	  as	  expertise	  and	  environment	  have	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  mental	  effort	  that	  subjects	  deploy	  to	  solve	  a	  particular	  task	  (Ayaz,	  Cakir,	  et	  al.,	  
2012;	  Ayaz,	  Shewokis,	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Murai,	  Hayashi,	  Okazaki,	  Stone,	  &	  Mitomo,	  2008).	  
Cognitive	  load	  may	  therefore	  need	  to	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  
given	  task	  and	  the	  individual	  involved	  in	  performing	  the	  task	  (Durantin,	  Gagnon,	  
Temblay,	  &	  Dehais,	  2014),	  and,	  despite	  years	  of	  research,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  how	  mental	  
effort	  is	  related	  to	  actual	  cognitive	  load.	  
	  
	   	  






Simple	  subjective	  rating	  scales	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  most	  common	  approach	  to	  representing	  
cognitive	  load.	  Their	  reliability	  and	  validity	  rests	  on	  the	  questionable	  assumption	  that	  
learners	  are	  able	  to	  reflect	  and	  report	  on	  their	  own	  cognitive	  processes	  accurately	  (Paas	  
&	  Van	  Merriënboer,	  1994),	  but	  by	  their	  very	  nature	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  
an	  absolute	  scale	  for	  ratings	  of	  mental	  effort	  or	  cognitive	  load,	  although	  they	  can	  be	  
useful	  for	  repeated	  comparisons	  of	  load	  with	  the	  same	  group	  of	  learners.	  Educators	  
should	  treat	  overall	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  with	  some	  care,	  and	  differentiation	  
between	  germane,	  extraneous,	  and	  intrinsic	  load	  remains	  challenging	  for	  all	  current	  
instruments.	  Different	  instructional	  materials	  may	  also	  produce	  different	  outcomes	  
depending	  on	  
the	  prior	  knowledge	  and	  individual	  characteristics	  of	  each	  learner,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  that	  
cognitive	  load	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  interaction	  of	  a	  number	  of	  these	  individual	  elements.	  
	  
Direct	  objective	  measures	  
	  
Direct	  objective	  measures	  include	  examples	  of	  eye-­‐tracking,	  dual-­‐task	  methodologies	  or	  
brain-­‐activity	  measures	  using	  neuroimaging	  approaches,	  such	  as	  functional	  near-­‐infrared	  
spectroscopy	  (fNIRS).	  The	  latter,	  whilst	  perhaps	  currently	  the	  most	  promising,	  is	  as	  yet	  
inconclusive	  because	  the	  connection	  between	  cognitive	  (memory)	  load	  and	  prefrontal	  
cortex	  activity	  is	  still	  imperfectly	  understood.	  
	  
Dual-­‐task	  methodologies	  (sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  dual-­‐task	  paradigm)	  can	  be	  
regarded	  as	  objective	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  use	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  limited	  central	  
processing	  system	  in	  the	  brain	  to	  argue	  that	  learner	  performance	  on	  a	  simple	  (secondary)	  
task,	  such	  as	  reacting	  quickly	  to	  a	  separate	  event,	  maintaining	  a	  counting	  task,	  or	  being	  able	  
to	  remember	  items	  seen	  on	  a	  separate	  computer	  screen,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  add	  cognitive	  
load	  to	  the	  same	  working	  memory	  processing	  system	  as	  the	  primary	  task.	  This	  assumption	  
allows	  researchers	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  elapsed	  time	  or	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  secondary	  
task	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  direct	  and	  individual	  measure	  of	  the	  cognitive	  load	  demanded	  by	  the	  
primary	  task,	  although	  some	  have	  concluded	  that	  dual-­‐task	  methodologies	  may	  be	  
intrinsically	  limited	  for	  use	  with	  complex	  instructional	  designs	  where	  the	  identification	  of	  an	  
appropriate	  secondary	  task	  may	  present	  inherently	  complex	  challenges	  that	  may	  be	  very	  
difficult	  to	  overcome	  (Kirschner	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Using	  reaction	  times	  to	  a	  secondary	  task	  
as	  a	  proxy	  measure	  for	  cognitive	  load	  has	  also	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  and	  difficulty	  
of	  choosing	  an	  appropriate	  secondary-­‐task	  design	  (Block,	  Hancock,	  &	  Zakay,	  2010;	  
Brünken	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Schoor,	  Bannert,	  &	  Brünken,	  2012).	  If	  the	  contiguous	  secondary	  
task	  becomes	  too	  intrusive,	  it	  may	  at	  times	  become	  the	  primary	  task,	  but	  secondary	  tasks	  
may	  not	  affect	  cognitive	  load	  when	  the	  task	  demand	  is	  low,	  because	  individuals	  would	  
possess	  sufficient	  working	  memory	  to	  successfully	  complete	  both	  primary	  and	  secondary	  
tasks.	  Additionally,	  the	  secondary	  task	  needs	  to	  align	  with	  the	  theoretical	  structure	  of	  the	  
theory,	  so	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  the	  two	  subsystems	  of	  working	  memory	  for	  phonological	  
and	  visuo-­‐spatial	  information	  are	  mostly	  independent,	  a	  visual	  secondary	  task	  may	  not	  
correctly	  reflect	  cognitive	  load	  in	  the	  auditory	  subsystem	  and	  vice	  versa,	  especially	  when	  our	  
understanding	  of	  how	  the	  cognitive	  load	  in	  these	  two	  subsystems	  affects	  overall	  cognitive	  
load	  is	  uncertain.	  
	  
This	  approach	  seems	  likely	  to	  become	  more	  problematic	  with	  repeated	  use	  if	  we	  consider	  
that	  subject	  performance	  may	  change	  over	  time	  simply	  as	  a	  result	  of	  learning	  from	  
practice	  at	  completing	  secondary	  tasks.	  Additionally,	  the	  secondary	  tasks	  involved	  must	  
demand	  access	  to	  the	  same	  mental	  resources	  as	  the	  primary	  task,	  the	  performance	  
measures	  need	  to	  be	  reliable	  and	  valid,	  and	  the	  secondary	  task	  has	  to	  be	  simple,	  so	  that	  it	  
does	  not	  prevent	  simultaneous	  learning	  processes,	  but	  strong	  enough	  to	  potentially	  
consume	  all	  of	  the	  relevant	  cognitive	  capacity.	  The	  duration	  of	  a	  secondary	  task	  also	  appears	  
to	  influence	  activity	  more	  than	  its	  degree	  of	  difficulty	  (Towse	  &	  Hitch,	  1995).	  Secondary-­‐task	  
methodology	  is	  therefore	  regarded	  as	  a	  sensitive	  and	  reliable	  technique	  under	  certain	  
conditions	  but	  has	  drawbacks	  that	  may	  limit	  its	  wider	  use;	  it	  interferes	  with	  the	  primary	  task,	  
and	  this	  effect	  is	  more	  pronounced	  with	  more	  complex	  tasks	  or	  when	  cognitive	  load	  is	  high;	  
and	  it	  is	  unsuited	  to	  real-­‐time	  or	  continuous	  measures	  (Lin	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
	  
Process-­‐tracking	  methods	  such	  as	  concurrent	  or	  retrospective	  verbal	  reports	  from	  subjects	  
have	  also	  been	  applied	  along	  with	  eye-­‐tracking	  studies	  that	  trace	  fixation	  patterns,	  eye	  
blink,	  and	  pupil	  dilation	  to	  evaluate	  cognitive	  load	  and	  map	  shifts	  in	  user	  attention	  (e.g.,	  
Chen	  &	  Epps,	  2013;	  Irwin	  &	  Thomas,	  2010;	  Klingner,	  Tversky,	  &	  Hanrahan,	  2010;	  
Kramer,	  1991;	  Theeuwes	  &	  Belopolsky,	  2010;	  Zheng	  &	  Cook,	  2012).	  Supporters	  of	  
these	  approaches	  promote	  their	  advantages	  in	  collecting	  data	  in	  real	  time	  and	  critique	  
other	  approaches	  such	  as	  performance	  scoring	  (e.g.,	  accuracy	  or	  reaction	  times)	  and	  
subjective	  self-­‐ratings	  as	  being	  too	  reliant	  on	  overt	  and	  discrete	  participant	  responses	  and	  as	  
postprocessing	  measures.	  Studies	  have	  found	  that	  blink	  activity	  (latency	  and	  rate),	  pupil	  size,	  
and	  fixation	  duration	  and	  rate	  all	  correlate	  significantly	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  demand	  
on	  working	  memory,	  with	  blink	  latency,	  pupil	  size,	  and	  fixation	  duration	  progressively	  
increasing	  in	  line	  with	  task	  difficulty	  and	  blink	  rate,	  fixation	  rate,	  and	  saccade	  speed	  and	  
size	  decreasing	  similarly.	  The	  hypothesis	  offered	  by	  such	  work	  is	  that	  eye	  blink,	  pupillary	  
response	  to	  tasks,	  and	  eye	  movement	  each	  reflect	  different	  but	  complementary	  information	  
about	  cognitive	  activity	  because	  they	  are	  each	  controlled	  by	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  nervous	  
system.	  
	  
Some	  features	  of	  eye	  activity	  may	  therefore	  be	  useful	  approaches	  for	  discriminating	  
between	  different	  levels	  of	  cognitive	  load	  (Jacob	  &	  Karn,	  2003).	  A	  significant	  amount	  of	  
research	  literature	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  pupil	  size	  varies	  as	  a	  function	  of	  experienced	  
cognitive	  load,	  the	  level	  of	  drowsiness,	  and	  mood,	  feelings,	  or	  attitude,	  or	  affective	  state	  
(Grandchamp,	  Braboszcz,	  &	  Delorme,	  2014),	  although	  the	  results	  from	  some	  studies	  in	  
this	  area	  (e.g.,	  Chen,	  Epps,	  Ruiz,	  &	  Chen,	  2011)	  conflict	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  others	  
(Greef,	  Lafeber,	  Oostendorp,	  &	  Lindenberg,	  2009;	  Van	  Orden,	  Limbert,	  Makeig,	  &	  
Jung,	  2009).	  
	  
The	  application	  of	  such	  research	  may	  still	  rely	  on	  self-­‐report	  measures,	  where	  a	  number	  
of	  occulometric	  measures	  such	  as	  blink	  frequency,	  pupils	  size,	  and	  gaze	  position	  may	  be	  
used	  to	  monitor	  behaviour	  such	  as	  self-­‐reported	  mind	  wandering,	  where	  participants	  use	  
a	  button	  press	  to	  indicate	  occasions	  when	  they	  had	  forgotten	  to	  continue	  a	  counting	  
exercise	  (Grandchamp	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  One	  limitation	  of	  this	  approach,	  as	  with	  other	  self-­‐report	  
systems,	  is	  that	  it	  still	  relies	  on	  the	  validity	  and	  accuracy	  of	  user	  reports.	  In	  the	  above	  
study,	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  subjects	  reporting	  fewer	  mind-­‐wandering	  episodes	  
than	  others	  could	  have	  experienced	  fewer	  of	  these	  or	  instead	  may	  simply	  have	  been	  less	  
sensitive	  in	  detecting	  them.	  Other	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  pupil	  dilation	  
can	  be	  affected	  by	  conditions	  such	  as	  depression,	  making	  this	  approach	  to	  measuring	  
cognitive	  load	  ungeneralisable	  to	  the	  wider	  population	  (Siegle,	  Steinhauer,	  &	  Thase,	  2004).	  
Also,	  pupil	  dilation	  is	  regarded	  by	  some	  as	  an	  imperfect	  measure	  of	  brain	  activity	  
because	  it	  does	  not	  control	  for	  many	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  brightness	  of	  the	  stimulus	  
applied,	  or	  tiredness.	  Additionally,	  many	  eye-­‐related	  studies	  of	  cognitive	  load	  make	  use	  of	  
the	  Stroop	  Colour	  Naming	  Task,	  which	  is	  a	  widely	  used	  test	  of	  selective	  attention	  that	  
requires	  participants	  to	  name	  the	  colour	  of	  the	  ink	  in	  which	  words	  that	  are	  the	  names	  of	  
colours	  are	  written.	  Generally,	  people	  make	  more	  mistakes	  when	  the	  word	  is	  not	  the	  
same	  as	  the	  colour	  in	  which	  it	  is	  written	  (e.g.,	  the	  word	  “blue”	  printed	  in	  red	  ink)	  than	  
when	  the	  word	  and	  the	  colour	  are	  the	  same	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  MacLeod,	  1992).	  
	  
However,	  results	  from	  such	  studies	  are	  felt	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  
participant	  attention,	  individuals	  reflecting	  on	  the	  previous	  stimulus,	  and	  also	  any	  mental	  
processing	  that	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  task	  about	  which,	  of	  course,	  the	  experimenters	  would	  
have	  little	  or	  no	  information	  (Siegle	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  In	  particular,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Stroop	  Test	  has	  
been	  shown	  to	  create	  increased	  distractor	  interference	  effects	  when	  cognitive	  load	  becomes	  
high	  (Gibbons	  &	  Stahl,	  2010).	  
	  
Although	  eye	  movement,	  pupil	  dilation,	  and	  blink	  rate	  are	  generally	  regarded	  as	  sensitive	  
psychophysiological	  metrics	  for	  monitoring	  cognitive	  load	  (Klingner,	  Kumar,	  &	  Hanrahan,	  
2008;	  O’Brien,	  2006;	  Palinko,	  Kun,	  Shyrokov,	  &	  Heeman,	  2010),	  they	  have	  at	  times	  
been	  found	  unsuitable	  for	  this	  use	  in	  older	  people,	  where,	  for	  example,	  mean	  pupil	  dilation	  
has	  been	  found	  to	  increase	  as	  a	  function	  of	  memory	  load	  in	  younger	  participants	  but	  has	  not	  
been	  found	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  memory	  load	  for	  older	  participants	  (Van	  Gerven,	  Paas,	  Van	  
Merriënboer,	  &	  Schmidt,	  2004).	  The	  usefulness	  of	  this	  approach	  as	  a	  sensitive	  correlate	  
for	  fluctuations	  in	  memory	  load	  may	  therefore	  diminish	  with	  age,	  and	  age-­‐related	  
differences	  in	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  pupil	  to	  cognitive	  load	  would	  therefore	  make	  it	  difficult	  
to	  compare	  different	  age	  groups	  because	  different	  levels	  of	  dilation	  may	  not	  correlate	  with	  
the	  different	  levels	  of	  experienced	  cognitive	  load.	  
	  
Brisson’s	  comparison	  study	  of	  pupil	  dilation	  using	  different	  eye-­‐tracking	  equipment	  
systems	  also	  found	  that	  each	  system	  created	  different	  errors	  and	  that	  the	  written	  
construction	  and	  layout	  of	  the	  language	  being	  observed	  affected	  participant	  “arousal”	  as	  
measured	  by	  the	  three	  different	  systems	  (Brisson	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  In	  this	  study,	  a	  language	  like	  
English	  (left-­‐to-­‐tight,	  top-­‐down	  sequence,	  and	  layout)	  could	  “arouse”	  participants	  most	  at	  
the	  start	  of	  reading	  but	  less	  towards	  the	  end,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  subject	  or	  content	  of	  the	  
text.	  Unless	  equipment	  from	  different	  manufacturers	  is	  able	  to	  compensate	  for	  point	  of	  gaze	  
in	  pupil	  size	  measurement,	  the	  use	  of	  eye	  tracking	  methodologies	  will	  need	  careful	  
experimenter	  calibration	  to	  ensure	  the	  reliability	  and	  replicability	  of	  their	  work.	  
	  
So,	  although	  concurrent	  or	  retrospective	  verbal	  reporting,	  eye	  tracking,	  gaze	  fixation	  
duration,	  and	  concept	  mapping	  may	  be	  useful	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load,	  they	  may	  actually	  
be	  measuring	  different	  constructs	  within	  this.	  As	  noted	  by	  Van	  Gog,	  Kester,	  Nievelstein,	  
and	  Paas	  (2009),	  subjects	  who	  report	  less	  invested	  mental	  effort	  can	  also	  have	  higher	  
mean	  fixation	  durations	  during	  parts	  of	  a	  task	  than	  others	  reporting	  higher	  invested	  
mental	  effort,	  which	  may	  be	  because	  data	  on	  mental	  effort	  usually	  relate	  to	  overall	  task	  
processes	  whereas	  mean	  fixation	  data	  are	  often	  calculated	  for	  parts	  of	  task	  processes.	  
Concurrent	  and	  retrospective	  verbal	  reporting	  are	  also	  problematic	  because	  they	  result	  in	  
different	  types	  of	  information	  and	  seem	  to	  be	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  time	  at	  which	  the	  
reports	  are	  generated	  (Van	  Gog	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  It	  seems	  probable	  that	  they	  therefore	  rely	  on	  
different	  memory	  systems	  and	  that	  different	  techniques	  such	  as	  verbal	  reporting,	  eye	  
tracking,	  and	  concept	  mapping	  are	  sensitive	  to	  different	  mental	  processes	  or	  cerebral	  
structures,	  and	  such	  concerns	  strengthen	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  use	  of	  combined	  measures	  
approaches.	  However,	  asking	  participants	  questions	  or	  to	  explain	  their	  experiences	  tends	  to	  
provoke	  reflection,	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  information	  that	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  
part	  of	  the	  process.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  whilst	  concurrent	  reporting	  during	  instruction	  
overcomes	  the	  risk	  of	  post-­‐hoc	  reports	  being	  inaccurate,	  its	  application	  draws	  on	  working	  
memory,	  and	  it	  may	  therefore	  become	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  under	  high	  cognitive	  load.	  
	  
Other	  approaches	  have	  used	  computer-­‐based	  studies	  to	  infer	  the	  experiences	  of	  learners	  
from	  activity	  logs	  or	  real-­‐time	  playback	  recordings	  to	  record	  cognitive-­‐load	  experiences	  
and	  the	  problems	  that	  learners	  meet.	  Direct	  objective	  measures	  are	  probably	  the	  only	  
ones	  that	  could	  claim	  to	  measure	  cognitive	  load	  without	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  subjective	  
information	  such	  as	  self-­‐report	  data,	  indirect	  measures,	  or	  other	  (e.g.,	  physiological)	  factors	  
that	  may	  have	  only	  a	  tangential	  link	  to	  cognitive	  load	  and	  be	  potentially	  strongly	  affected	  by	  
other	  factors,	  but	  these	  are	  by	  no	  means	  free	  of	  difficulty,	  and	  data	  from	  them	  when	  used	  
in	  educational	  settings	  need	  to	  be	  interpreted	  cautiously.	  
	  
Direct	  objective	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  are	  highly	  desired	  by	  educators	  and	  educational	  
assessment	  systems	  internationally,	  but	  instruments	  attempting	  to	  secure	  these	  
require	  very	  careful	  use	  and	  interpretation	  by	  educators	  and	  many	  still	  rely	  on	  elements	  
of	  self-­‐report.	  Others	  have	  produced	  conflicting	  reports	  and,	  as	  with	  subjective	  measures,	  
a	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  different	  constructs	  within	  overall	  cognitive	  
load,	  or	  even	  other	  mental	  processes,	  may	  be	  being	  measured	  along	  with	  a	  range	  of	  
individual	  physiological	  features.	  
	  
Indirect	  objective	  measures	  
	  
Indirect	  objective	  measures	  include	  physiological	  approaches	  using	  electroencephalography	  
(EEG)	  or	  cardiovascular	  metrics	  or	  learning	  outcome	  measures,	  often	  combined	  with	  
interaction	  features.	  These	  are	  regarded	  as	  objective	  because	  they	  are	  perceived	  as	  
measures	  of	  intellectual	  performance	  and	  as	  indirect	  because	  the	  factors	  measured	  are	  
affected	  by	  the	  information	  processing	  and	  retrieval	  process	  that	  is	  taking	  place.	  There	  is	  a	  
long	  history	  of	  the	  use	  of	  indirect	  objective	  approaches	  to	  evaluate	  stress,	  affective,	  and	  
arousal	  states	  especially	  when	  psychological	  measures	  are	  correlated	  with	  physiological	  
signals	  such	  as	  speech	  and	  linguistic	  features,	  facial	  expression,	  eye/body	  movement,	  or	  
galvanic	  skin	  response	  (Shi,	  Choi,	  Ruiz,	  &	  Taib,	  2007;	  Yap,	  Ambikairajah,	  Choi,	  &	  Chen,	  2009;	  
Yap,	  Epps,	  Ambikairajah,	  &	  Choi	  2011).	  Many	  speech	  features	  have	  also	  been	  used	  to	  
measure	  cognitive	  load	  such	  as	  speech	  rate,	  pause	  rate,	  onset	  delay,	  and	  interruption	  rate,	  
along	  with	  mouse-­‐speed	  and	  pressure,	  linguistic	  patterns,	  heart	  rate,	  performance	  
methods	  such	  as	  error-­‐rates	  or	  tests,	  and	  subjective	  methods	  of	  rating	  experienced	  loads	  
(e.g.,	  Khawaja,	  Ruis,	  &	  Chen,	  2007;	  Lin	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Yin,	  Chen,	  Ruiz,	  &	  Ambikairajah,	  
2008).	  Such	  measures	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  helpful	  because	  they	  are	  continuous	  and	  
allow	  very	  fine	  granularity	  in	  the	  measure	  which	  can	  also	  be	  repeated	  at	  high	  rates,	  but	  
for	  the	  most	  part	  they	  are	  probably	  outside	  the	  scope	  and	  resources	  available	  in	  the	  majority	  
of	  educational	  settings	  at	  this	  time.	  
	  
Physiological	  measures	  can	  include	  heart-­‐rate	  monitoring,	  EEG	  measures,	  eye	  tracking,	  
and	  pupillary	  response	  and	  assume	  that	  changes	  in	  cognitive	  load	  are	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  
physiological	  changes	  which	  are	  equally	  assumed	  to	  be	  involuntary	  and	  therefore	  objective	  
and	  have	  claimed	  high	  levels	  of	  classification	  accuracy,	  but	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  such	  
outputs	  are	  also	  sensitive	  to	  confounds	  of	  subject	  expertise,	  age,	  and	  physical	  or	  mental	  
variations	  (e.g.,	  Khawaja	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Yin	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  For	  example,	  working	  memory	  
span	  appears	  to	  develop	  as	  children	  grow	  older	  (e.g.,	  to	  around	  age	  8–9)	  such	  that	  older	  
children	  can	  more	  easily	  switch	  their	  attention	  from	  their	  immediate	  mental	  task	  and	  can	  
exert	  more	  control	  over	  their	  attention,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  result	  of	  developing	  faster	  and	  more	  
efficient	  mental	  processing	  and	  more	  attentional	  capacity	  (Gavens	  &	  Barrouillet,	  2004).	  
Individuals	  with	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐working	  memory	  spans	  differ	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  suppress	  
task-­‐irrelevant	  behaviour	  and	  information	  (e.g.,	  extraneous	  cognitive	  load).	  Low-­‐span	  
individuals	  appear	  to	  find	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  task	  goals	  in	  working	  memory,	  and	  
this	  is	  argued	  to	  be	  due	  to	  their	  poorer	  attentional	  control	  (Unsworth,	  Schrock,	  &	  Engle,	  
2004).	  Low-­‐span	  and	  high-­‐span	  individuals	  differ	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  they	  
can	  switch	  attention	  between	  tasks	  or	  sub-­‐elements	  of	  tasks	  whilst	  learning,	  although	  they	  
may	  in	  addition	  differ	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  process	  information,	  and	  both	  of	  these	  may	  
affect	  results	  (Unsworth	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Studies	  using	  indirect	  objective	  measures	  often	  feature	  a	  number	  of	  groups	  of	  participants	  
each	  using	  some	  variation	  of	  instruction	  about	  the	  same	  material.	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  
intrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  imposed	  is	  the	  same	  in	  all	  cases	  as	  the	  material	  to	  be	  learnt	  is	  the	  
same	  for	  all	  participants	  and,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  feature,	  the	  use	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  
more	  common	  in	  educational	  settings	  than	  others	  discussed	  here.	  The	  assumption	  is	  that	  
the	  more	  effective	  and	  efficient	  the	  instructional	  method	  is,	  the	  more	  students	  will	  learn	  and	  
the	  lower	  will	  be	  the	  extraneous	  cognitive	  load	  due	  to	  the	  instructional	  process.	  However,	  
much	  can	  depend	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  measures	  that	  are	  used	  to	  test	  the	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  how	  
long	  a	  learner	  takes	  to	  complete	  a	  task,	  and	  some	  studies	  have	  identified	  this	  as	  a	  serious	  
weakness	  in	  this	  approach	  (Brünken,	  Steinbacher,	  Schnotz,	  &	  Leutner,	  2001;	  Mayer,	  2001),	  
whilst	  others	  have	  noted	  that	  such	  learning	  outcomes	  are	  also	  consistently	  influenced	  by	  
individual	  learner	  traits	  (Mayer,	  2001;	  Plass,	  Chun,	  Mayer,	  &	  Leutner,	  
2003).	  Behavioural	  and	  physiological	  measures	  using	  eye-­‐tracking,	  heart-­‐rate,	  or	  
pupildilation	  analysis	  similarly	  assume	  that	  changes	  in	  cognitive	  load	  are	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  
physiological	  changes	  which	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  involuntary	  and	  therefore	  objective.	  
However,	  each	  has	  the	  drawback	  of	  providing	  only	  indirect	  connections	  to	  cognitive	  
load,	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  such	  activity	  may	  be	  due	  to	  individual	  differences	  in	  stress	  or	  
emotional	  reactions	  to	  the	  learning	  materials,	  which	  may	  be	  unknown	  to	  the	  instructor	  in	  
a	  given	  educational	  setting.	  
	  
The	  left	  brain	  hemisphere	  is	  involved	  in	  speech	  and	  memory,	  whereas	  the	  right	  hemisphere	  
is	  necessary	  for	  physical	  response	  to	  external	  events	  and	  for	  attention	  shifting,	  and	  
electroencephalography	  (EEG)	  and	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  (MRI)	  are	  two	  established	  
technologies	  for	  measuring	  and	  classifying	  such	  brain	  activity,	  although	  care	  is	  needed	  in	  
interpreting	  outputs	  from	  these	  and	  similar	  approaches	  (Freeman,	  Ahlfors,	  &	  Menon,	  
2009).	  EEG	  records	  electrical	  activity	  across	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  brain	  arising	  from	  currents	  
within	  the	  neurons	  in	  the	  brain,	  and	  these	  data	  can	  be	  used	  to	  detect	  how	  long	  it	  takes	  the	  
brain	  to	  process	  certain	  stimuli,	  such	  as	  those	  experienced	  during	  learning.	  During	  learning,	  
the	  neurons	  in	  different	  active	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  will	  consume	  more	  oxygen	  and	  therefore	  
also	  generate	  different	  levels	  of	  a	  tiny	  magnetic	  signature	  which	  can	  be	  detected	  by	  the	  
powerful	  magnetic	  fields	  generated	  within	  a	  MRI	  scanner.	  Volumetric	  images	  of	  these	  
different	  signatures	  can	  then	  be	  created	  from	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  blood-­‐oxygenation	  
level-­‐dependent	  contrasts	  to	  make	  a	  functional	  image	  (map)	  of	  the	  neural	  correlates	  of	  
cognitive	  tasks.	  
	  
Recent	  research	  in	  neuroscience	  has	  developed	  a	  number	  of	  instruments	  for	  studying	  
brain	  function	  during	  problem	  solving	  and	  learning.	  Event-­‐related	  functional	  magnetic	  
resonance	  (fMRI)	  has	  been	  used	  to	  map	  the	  amount	  of	  hemodynamic	  activity	  (oxygen	  
saturation	  and	  blood	  flow)	  in	  regions	  within	  the	  brain	  during	  learning.	  This	  provides	  
researchers	  with	  longitudinal	  measures	  of	  rapidly	  changing	  cognitive	  activity	  across	  a	  range	  
of	  specific	  brain	  areas,	  and,	  it	  has	  been	  argued,	  may	  even	  be	  able	  to	  measure	  the	  different	  
types	  of	  cognitive	  load	  (Whelan,	  2007).	  However,	  at	  present	  the	  bulky	  and	  sophisticated	  
equipment	  needed	  make	  the	  use	  of	  fMRI	  make	  it	  impractical	  for	  all	  but	  the	  most	  specialised	  
contexts,	  and	  this	  effectively	  rules	  it	  out	  as	  a	  practical	  application	  for	  almost	  all	  educational	  
settings.	  
	  
Grimes,	  Tan,	  Hudson,	  Shenoy,	  and	  Rao	  (2008)	  used	  EEG	  to	  measure	  visual	  task	  difficulty	  
and	  extract	  related	  data	  for	  cognitive	  load,	  but	  could	  not	  easily	  distinguish	  between	  the	  
different	  sub-­‐types	  of	  cognitive	  load,	  and	  determining	  task	  difficulty	  proved	  difficult.	  As	  
EEG	  measures	  are	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  specific	  user	  task,	  this	  was	  a	  significant	  
limitation.	  In	  a	  later	  study,	  Anderson	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  used	  EEG	  to	  estimate	  and	  classify	  the	  
cognitive	  effort	  dedicated	  to	  holding	  information	  in	  the	  mind	  for	  short	  periods	  of	  time	  while	  
performing	  another	  cognitive	  task.	  The	  results	  showed	  high	  memory	  load	  classification	  
accuracy	  both	  within	  and	  across	  different	  tasks,	  although	  variations	  across	  different	  users	  
were	  substantial.	  Instead	  of	  classifying	  individuals	  according	  to	  cognitive	  load,	  studies	  
such	  as	  these	  may	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  one	  potential	  way	  forwards	  might	  be	  to	  group	  
together	  those	  who	  exhibit	  similar	  characteristics	  in	  their	  EEG	  signal	  and	  then	  apply	  different	  
models	  to	  classify	  their	  load.	  
	  
As	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  bulky	  and	  highly	  expensive	  EEG	  and	  MRI/fMRI	  technologies,	  
functional	  near	  infrared	  spectroscopy	  (fNIRS)	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  observes	  
closely	  similar	  physiological	  parameters	  to	  fMRI	  (Chance	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Strangman,	  
Culver,	  Thompson,	  &	  Boas,	  2002).	  Because	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  measure	  activity	  in	  localised	  
areas	  of	  the	  brain,	  most	  commonly	  in	  the	  anterior	  prefrontal	  cortex,	  it	  has	  emerged	  over	  the	  
last	  decade	  as	  a	  promising	  technology	  for	  brain	  imaging.	  The	  approach	  takes	  advantage	  of	  
the	  way	  light	  at	  near-­‐infrared	  frequencies	  penetrates	  bone	  and	  biological	  tissue	  but	  is	  
absorbed	  by	  haemoglobin	  in	  the	  bloodstream.	  Neural	  activity	  (such	  as	  learning	  or	  cognitive	  
task	  completion)	  is	  accompanied	  by	  increased	  oxygen	  demands	  by	  neurons	  in	  order	  to	  
metabolise	  glucose	  for	  energy,	  and	  fMRI	  detects	  the	  opening	  of	  capillaries	  in	  cortical	  
areas	  where	  carbon	  dioxide	  has	  accumulated	  in	  response	  to	  neurons	  burning	  glucose.	  
	  
First	  proposed	  in	  2004	  as	  a	  portable	  brain-­‐computer	  interface	  suitable	  for	  long-­‐term	  use,	  
fNIRS	  uses	  near-­‐infrared	  light	  to	  detect	  levels	  of	  oxygenated	  and	  deoxygenated	  haemoglobin	  
on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (Coyle,	  Ward,	  Markham,	  &	  McDarby,	  2004)	  and	  is	  a	  
low-­‐cost	  non-­‐invasive	  neuroimaging	  technique	  that	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  both	  
cognitive	  loads	  and	  states	  and	  is	  a	  viable	  alternative	  to	  fMRI	  (Fishburn,	  Norr,	  Medvedev,	  &	  
Vaidya,	  2014).	  The	  validity	  of	  fNIRS	  measurement	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  confirmed	  in	  recent	  
years,	  and	  results	  can	  be	  reliably	  reproduced,	  even	  over	  time	  spans	  of	  1	  year.	  Studies	  also	  
have	  found	  that	  fNIRS	  results	  are	  highly	  consistent	  with	  fMRI	  findings	  (Afergan	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  
but	  its	  great	  advantage	  over	  MRI	  and	  EEG	  is	  that	  it	  has	  become	  increasingly	  portable	  with	  
relatively	  low-­‐cost	  wireless	  instruments	  now	  available,	  and	  because	  it	  uses	  much	  less	  bulky	  
equipment	  it	  can	  more	  easily	  be	  used	  in	  authentic	  learning	  situations	  (Ferrari	  &	  Quaresima,	  
2012).	  Applications	  of	  fNIRS	  are	  steadily	  moving	  closer	  towards	  use	  in	  routine	  classroom	  
situations,	  and	  this	  promising	  technology	  seems	  set	  to	  make	  inroads	  into	  mainstream	  
educational	  research	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  
	  
Some	  studies	  have	  used	  fNIRS	  to	  determine	  that	  haemodynamic	  levels	  in	  certain	  brain	  
regions	  are	  related	  to	  problem-­‐solver	  expertise,	  explaining	  at	  least	  73%	  of	  the	  variation	  
between	  participants	  solving	  tangram	  puzzles,	  suggesting	  that	  better	  problem	  solvers	  
increasingly	  become	  less	  dependent	  on	  neuronal	  resources	  as	  they	  continue	  working	  on	  
subsequent	  tangram	  puzzles	  (e.g.,	  Cakir	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Similarly	  Shaw,	  Satterfield,	  
Ramirez,	  and	  Finomore	  (2013)	  used	  Doppler	  tomography	  during	  a	  communication	  vigilance	  
task,	  reporting	  that	  novice	  learners	  produced	  greater	  mental	  activity	  than	  experienced	  
learners	  and	  were	  thus	  assumed	  to	  have	  expended	  greater	  cognitive	  effort;	  this	  study	  also	  
concluded	  that	  cerebral	  blood	  flow	  speed	  can	  be	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  amount	  of	  cerebral	  
resources	  used	  to	  complete	  a	  task.	  Similarly,	  Durantin	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  looked	  at	  the	  piloting	  
of	  remotely	  operated	  vehicles	  and	  compared	  fNIRS	  with	  two	  well-­‐established	  measures	  
of	  mental	  workload	  (heart-­‐rate	  variability	  and	  subjective	  self-­‐reports)	  and	  found	  that	  fNIRS	  
proved	  effective	  at	  measuring	  mental	  overload	  detection.	  
	  
Evidence	  supporting	  the	  possibility	  of	  more	  self-­‐regulating	  technologies	  for	  managing	  
cognitive	  load	  comes	  from	  studies	  aiming	  to	  optimise	  workload	  and	  learning	  in	  real	  time	  
through	  measuring	  extended	  periods	  of	  boredom	  or	  cognitive	  overload.	  Participants	  in	  
one	  such	  study	  conducted	  path	  planning	  in	  a	  high-­‐frequency	  interaction	  environment	  for	  
multiple	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles	  (“drones”)	  in	  a	  simulated	  environment.	  It	  was	  found	  
that	  fNIRS	  was	  able	  to	  detect	  variations	  in	  task	  difficulty	  by	  changing	  the	  task	  difficulty	  
dynamically,	  usually	  by	  adding	  or	  removing	  the	  number	  of	  vehicles	  to	  be	  monitored	  
simultaneously	  in	  response	  to	  measurement	  made	  with	  fNIRS	  (Afergan	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  This	  
approach	  reduced	  the	  operator	  failure	  rate	  by	  35%	  whilst	  creating	  conditions	  where	  they	  
also	  exhibited	  higher	  levels	  of	  alertness	  for	  addressing	  problems,	  supporting	  findings	  
from	  earlier	  similar	  studies	  using	  military	  flight	  simulators	  (e.g.,	  Huttunen,	  Keränen,	  
Väyrynen,	  Pääkkönen,	  &	  Lenio,	  2011).	  
	  
Although	  increasing	  cognitive	  load	  produces	  different	  brain	  network	  responses	  in	  
younger	  than	  in	  older	  individuals,	  the	  key	  principle	  behind	  both	  fMRI	  and	  fNIRS	  is	  the	  
same;	  that	  selective	  brain	  regions	  show	  progressively	  increased	  activity	  as	  cognitive	  load	  
is	  increased	  (typically	  in	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex),	  but	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  other	  brain	  
regions	  are	  also	  involved	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  task	  (O’Hare,	  Lu,	  Houston,	  
Brookheimer,	  &	  Sowell,	  2008)	  and	  that,	  generally,	  the	  longer	  and	  more	  intense	  the	  learning	  
stimulus	  the	  longer	  the	  duration	  required	  for	  recovery	  in	  cortical	  haemodynamics	  
between	  learning	  sessions	  (Leff	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  fNIRS	  therefore	  seems	  able	  to	  detect	  workload	  
in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  contexts	  that	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  working	  
memory	  and	  has	  been	  used	  in	  studies	  where	  aircrew	  were	  piloting	  unmanned	  air	  vehicles	  
(Ayaz,	  Cakir,	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Ayaz,	  Shewokis,	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  when	  participants	  were	  part	  of	  
a	  human-­‐robot	  team	  (Solovey	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  when	  evaluating	  complex	  visual	  tasks	  (Peck,	  
Yuksel,	  Ottley,	  Jacob,	  &	  Chang,	  2013),	  and	  whilst	  driving	  vehicles	  (Tsunashima	  &	  Yanagisawa,	  
2009).	  One	  study	  of	  groups	  during	  a	  driving	  video-­‐game	  found	  that	  the	  left	  and	  
right	  prefrontal	  cortex	  differentiate	  between	  intrinsic	  and	  extrinsic	  cognitive	  load	  according	  
to	  the	  predictability	  of	  events	  such	  as	  manoeuvring	  a	  vehicle	  (e.g.,	  turning).	  Regardless	  of	  
whether	  cognitive	  load	  was	  able	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  intrinsic	  or	  extrinsic	  factors,	  this	  study	  
also	  identified	  additional	  different	  brain	  regions	  involved	  in	  preparation	  for	  action,	  although	  
load	  type	  did	  affect	  activation	  patterns	  (Liu,	  Saito,	  &	  Oi,	  2012).	  
	  
Earlier	  fNIRS	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  if	  load	  increases	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reduced	  task	  
performance,	  the	  signal	  changes	  in	  ways	  that	  suggest	  a	  capacity-­‐limited	  response	  (e.g.,	  
Callicott	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  However,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  such	  measures	  requires	  care,	  and	  the	  
relationship	  between	  task	  difficulty,	  mental	  effort,	  and	  brain	  activity	  is	  non-­‐linear	  and	  
subtle	  (Jaeggi	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Additionally,	  cognitive	  load	  produces	  different	  brain	  network	  
responses	  in	  younger	  than	  in	  older	  individuals	  (O’Hare	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  and	  so	  maturation	  
effects	  –	  at	  present	  poorly	  understood	  –	  should	  also	  be	  accommodated	  in	  future	  measures.	  
	  
Physiological	  measures	  may	  therefore	  claim	  high	  reliability	  but	  pose	  difficulties	  of	  construct	  
validity	  because	  their	  outputs	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  range	  of	  factors	  that	  are	  exposed	  to	  
problems	  of	  multi-­‐causality.	  Despite	  the	  ability	  of	  fNIRS	  to	  track	  the	  functional	  pathways	  of	  
the	  brain	  that	  mediate	  the	  maintaining	  and	  manipulating	  of	  attention,	  one	  problem	  with	  
current	  research	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  standardised	  approach	  to	  extracting	  features	  from	  the	  
signal	  or	  a	  prevailing	  consensus	  about	  which	  features	  of	  the	  fNIRS	  signal	  may	  result	  in	  the	  
highest	  levels	  of	  accuracy	  (Peck,	  Afergan,	  Yuksel,	  Lalooses,	  &	  Jacob,	  2014).	  Researchers	  also	  
do	  not	  know	  in	  advance	  whether	  a	  period	  of	  interaction	  should	  be	  producing	  high	  or	  low	  
mental	  workload.	  
	  
Novice	  performance	  often	  falls	  at	  difficult	  levels	  whilst	  expert	  users	  show	  a	  strong	  increase,	  
suggesting	  that	  fNIRS	  may	  have	  valuable	  potential	  for	  establishing	  user	  expertise	  in	  real	  
time	  as	  part	  of	  an	  adaptive	  system	  that	  could	  calibrate	  instructional	  content	  based	  on	  the	  
sensed	  expertise	  of	  the	  learner	  (Bunce	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  So	  whilst	  fNIRS	  is	  able	  to	  measure	  
signal	  changes	  over	  time	  with	  great	  accuracy,	  its	  use	  and	  the	  interpretation	  of	  its	  signal	  
outputs	  requires	  care	  (as	  with	  EEG	  and	  FMRI),	  not	  least	  because	  the	  biological	  response	  
of	  the	  brain	  to	  neurological	  changes	  is	  more	  sluggish,	  as	  changes	  in	  the	  oxygenation	  and	  




The	  influence	  of	  individual	  differences	  on	  learning	  task	  performance	  is	  important	  because	  it	  
could	  significantly	  affect	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  and	  impact	  of	  cognitive	  load	  in	  
working	  memory.	  Evaluation	  that	  relies	  on	  verbal	  feedback	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  individual	  
preference	  and	  expectation,	  cultural	  biases	  in	  particular	  fields,	  or	  resistance	  to	  change	  
(Anderson	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
	  
Working	  memory	  capacity	  is	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  individual	  differences	  in	  controlling	  
attention.	  The	  capacity	  of	  working	  memory,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  its	  central	  executive	  element,	  is	  
therefore	  subject	  to	  volitional	  control	  and	  is	  variable	  between	  individuals.	  However,	  
although	  individuals	  possess	  different	  resources	  for	  mental	  processing,	  they	  may	  or	  may	  not	  
choose	  to	  make	  use	  of	  them	  in	  any	  given	  situation,	  as	  most	  experienced	  educators	  know	  
(Barrett,	  Tugade,	  &	  Engle,	  2004).	  The	  cognitive	  load	  and	  participant	  confidence	  
of	  e-­‐learners	  as	  they	  completed	  an	  asynchronous	  task	  showed	  that	  procedural	  and	  
subject	  knowledge	  or	  skill	  are	  not	  always	  enough	  to	  bring	  about	  successful	  learning	  and	  that	  
an	  individual’s	  self-­‐efficacy	  and	  motivation	  are	  also	  important,	  possibly	  more	  so	  (Martin	  &	  
Vallance,	  2008;	  McQuaid,	  2010).	  
	  
Educators	  and	  researchers	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  phenomenon	  whereby	  increases	  in	  cognitive	  
load	  are	  not	  always	  accompanied	  by	  a	  decrease	  in	  task	  performance	  or	  an	  increase	  in	  
time	  on	  task,	  as	  learning	  may	  be	  sustained	  by	  drawing	  on	  resources	  such	  as	  effort,	  
commitment	  to	  task,	  and	  motivation	  (Brünken,	  Plass,	  &	  Moreno,	  2010;	  Hockey,	  1997;	  Peck	  
et	  al.,	  2014).	  Performance	  on	  long	  tasks	  is	  known	  to	  decrease	  with	  time	  on	  task,	  but	  there	  
has	  been	  disagreement	  about	  the	  substantive	  cause	  of	  this	  well-­‐known	  effect,	  as	  decreases	  
in	  vigilance	  have	  also	  been	  known	  to	  appear	  in	  tasks	  lasting	  less	  than	  10	  min.	  (Matthews,	  
Davies,	  &	  Holley,	  1993;	  Robertson,	  Manly,	  Andrade,	  Baddeley,	  &	  Yiend,	  1997).	  Cognitive	  
load	  theory	  appears	  to	  explain	  attentional	  intensity	  more	  successfully	  than	  arousal	  theory	  
(see	  Stroh,	  1971,	  for	  an	  overview),	  where	  changes	  in	  vigilance	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  associated	  
mainly	  with	  long-­‐duration	  tasks.	  Several	  studies	  have	  argued	  that	  vigilance	  is	  determined	  
more	  by	  resource	  demands	  than	  by	  task	  duration,	  and	  subjective	  alertness	  may	  therefore	  
be	  a	  useful	  index	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  cognitive	  resources	  (Matthews	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Robertson	  
et	  al.,	  1997;	  Smit	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Stroh,	  1971).	  Similarly,	  although	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  task	  difficulty	  such	  as	  pressure	  of	  time	  and	  alertness	  when	  executing	  a	  memory	  
task	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  an	  overall	  effect,	  an	  important	  variable	  tends	  to	  be	  individual	  
differences,	  including	  alertness	  (Galy,	  Cariou,	  &	  Mélan,	  2012).	  
	  
It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  take	  due	  account	  of	  the	  large	  individual	  differences	  found	  in	  
fMRI	  research,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  differences	  in	  processing	  at	  capacity	  limits.	  These	  
differences	  are	  thought	  to	  most	  likely	  result	  from	  the	  more	  efficient	  use	  of	  resources	  that	  is	  
especially	  pronounced	  in	  high-­‐performing	  individuals.	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  these	  differences	  
are	  present,	  but	  it	  is	  thought	  to	  hinge	  on	  high-­‐performing	  individuals’	  better	  differentiation	  
between	  relevant	  and	  irrelevant	  information	  (Jaeggi	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Unsworth	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  
	  
Other	  studies	  have	  concluded	  that	  individuals	  with	  higher	  IQs	  have	  more	  cognitive	  
resources	  available	  for	  processing	  information	  and	  so	  experience	  lower	  cognitive	  
demands	  than	  less	  intelligent	  individuals	  engaged	  on	  the	  same	  task,	  probably	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  differences	  in	  the	  rates	  of	  information	  processing	  (Fink	  &	  Neubauer,	  2005).	  
High	  workload	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  be	  more	  detrimental	  to	  individuals	  with	  low	  cognitive	  
abilities	  than	  to	  those	  with	  high	  cognitive	  abilities,	  in	  both	  traditional	  learning	  settings	  
and	  contexts	  featuring	  blended	  or	  technology-­‐enhanced	  learning.	  Individuals	  with	  
low	  cognitive	  abilities	  also	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  workload	  during	  such	  learning	  
than	  those	  with	  high	  cognitive	  abilities,	  and	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  general	  link	  between	  
intelligence	  and	  learning	  in	  real-­‐time	  dynamic	  decision	  making	  tasks	  (Fink	  &	  Neubauer,	  2005;	  
Gonzalez,	  2005).	  A	  negative	  correlation	  has	  been	  found	  to	  exist	  between	  brain	  activity	  
under	  cognitive	  load	  and	  intelligence,	  suggesting	  that	  individuals	  with	  high	  IQ	  scores	  
process	  information	  more	  quickly	  and	  perhaps	  differently	  and	  may	  use	  more	  optimal	  
mental	  strategies	  than	  individuals	  with	  low	  IQ	  scores,	  even	  when	  no	  reasoning	  tasks	  are	  
involved,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  central	  executive	  in	  rates	  of	  controlling,	  
switching	  and	  focussing	  attention	  and	  in	  inhibiting	  irrelevant	  processes	  (Fink	  &	  Neubauer,	  
2005;	  Gibbons	  &	  Stahl,	  2010;	  Jaušovec	  &	  Jaušovec,	  2004).	  
	  
However,	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  central	  executive	  which	  controls	  this	  focus	  of	  attention	  in	  many	  
different	  situations	  remains	  the	  least	  well	  understood	  element	  of	  the	  working-­‐memory	  
system	  (Baddeley	  &	  Hitch,	  1994),	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  some	  earlier	  studies	  even	  undermines	  
the	  important	  related	  notion	  that	  the	  limitation	  of	  working	  memory	  relates	  to	  the	  number	  of	  
“chunks”	  that	  can	  be	  held	  in	  memory	  (see	  Unsworth	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  such	  
findings	  mask	  the	  operation	  of	  more	  complex	  underlying	  cognitive	  structures	  and	  prior	  
learned	  responses	  as,	  for	  example,	  when	  attempting	  to	  account	  for	  which	  cognitive	  
mechanism	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  longer	  reading	  times	  spent	  on	  words	  that	  convey	  more	  
information.	  Frank	  (2013)	  proposes	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  due	  to	  the	  reducing	  of	  meaning	  
uncertainty	  (reducing	  entropy)	  when	  reading	  words	  in	  sentences,	  but	  a	  mechanistic	  model	  
has	  not	  to	  date	  been	  established	  to	  develop	  this.	  
	  
Sex-­‐related	  differences	  in	  cognition	  have	  also	  been	  found	  for	  some	  spatial	  measures,	  
where	  a	  male	  advantage	  was	  present	  (Voyer,	  Voyer,	  &	  Bryden,	  1995),	  whereas	  a	  female	  
advantage	  has	  been	  found	  for	  some	  verbal	  measures	  (Crossley,	  D’Arcy,	  &	  Rawson,	  
1997;	  Kramer,	  Delis,	  &	  Daniel,	  1988;	  Norman,	  Evans,	  Miller,	  &	  Heaton,	  2000;	  Weiss	  
et	  al.,	  2006),	  when	  using	  object	  location	  memory	  measures	  (see	  Sykes	  Tottenham,	  
Saucier,	  Elias,	  &	  Gutwin,	  2003;	  Voyer,	  Postma,	  Brake,	  &	  Imperato-­‐McGinley,	  2007),	  for	  
spatial	  cognition,	  language,	  and	  memory	  (Lejbak,	  Crossley,	  &	  Vrbancic,	  2011).	  These	  findings	  
could	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  use	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  e-­‐learning	  or	  
blended-­‐learning	  solutions,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  take	  these	  into	  account	  when	  
instructors	  are	  designing	  or	  using	  multimedia	  or	  web-­‐based	  resources.	  Other	  working	  
memory	  tasks	  have	  also	  shown	  gender-­‐related	  differences	  in	  neural	  activity,	  although	  
findings	  have	  been	  inconsistent,	  and	  some	  studies	  have	  found	  contradictory	  outcomes,	  
suggesting	  that	  females	  and	  males	  may	  have	  used	  different	  strategies	  when	  completing	  
tasks	  and	  that	  older	  women	  had	  more	  difficulty	  completing	  the	  task,	  leading	  the	  authors	  to	  
speculate	  whether	  oestrogen	  levels	  played	  a	  part	  in	  this	  (Goldstein	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Lejbak	  et	  al.,	  
2011;	  Nagel,	  Ohannessian,	  &	  Cummins,	  2007;	  Speck	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  
	  
We	  might	  reasonably	  expect	  that	  learners	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  content	  expertise	  will	  
probably	  report	  different	  levels	  of	  both	  cognitive	  load	  and	  task	  complexity	  for	  a	  given	  task	  
because	  of	  differences	  in	  their	  automated	  germane	  prior	  learning	  and	  schema	  acquisition.	  
The	  level	  of	  expertise	  does	  appear	  to	  influence	  brain	  response	  for	  some	  complex	  tasks,	  but	  
as	  yet	  we	  have	  no	  reliable	  way	  of	  measuring	  the	  extent	  of	  an	  individual’s	  schema	  resources	  
and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  such	  automated	  prior	  learning	  mediates	  cognitive	  load	  during	  an	  
individual	  learning	  task	  (Ayaz,	  Cakir,	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Brünken,	  Seufert,	  &	  Paas,	  2010).	  
The	  prospect	  of	  obtaining	  indirect	  objective	  measures	  may	  lead	  educators	  to	  be	  less	  
concerned	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  individual	  schema	  acquisition,	  but	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  they	  
would	  be	  interested	  in	  metrics	  that	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  implications	  of	  different	  
kinds	  of	  prior	  learning.	  Reasonably	  reliable	  and	  valid	  indirect	  measures	  may	  prove	  to	  
have	  more	  immediate	  value	  to	  educators	  than	  direct	  measures	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  
complexity	  and	  uncertainty.	  However,	  this	  may	  be	  changing	  as	  fNIRS	  systems	  provide	  
increasingly	  sensitive	  interactive	  systems	  for	  mediating	  user	  experiences	  and	  subjective	  
alertness.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  training	  students	  in	  more	  generic	  skills	  such	  as	  
attention	  switching	  would	  be	  attractive,	  providing	  such	  skills	  were	  able	  to	  be	  transferred	  
across	  different	  tasks	  and	  knowledge	  domains,	  although	  educators	  may	  need	  to	  remain	  alert	  




Educators	  are	  understandably	  interested	  in	  promoting	  progressively	  higher	  levels	  of	  success	  
in	  learning	  outcomes	  whatever	  approach	  to	  educational	  pedagogy	  they	  adopt,	  and	  such	  
levels,	  however	  these	  are	  defined,	  are	  generally	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  instruments	  assessing	  
the	  effect	  of	  instruction.	  However,	  learning	  outcomes	  by	  themselves	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  
as	  valid	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
offer	  sufficient	  guidance	  on	  which	  resources	  or	  approaches	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  maximising	  
the	  future	  learning	  of	  an	  individual.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  measurement	  of	  cognitive	  load	  
needs	  to	  take	  account	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  motivation,	  self-­‐concept,	  and	  engagement	  with	  
the	  task	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  featured	  strongly	  in	  empirical	  or	  theoretical	  work	  in	  this	  area,	  
and	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  overarching	  metrics	  in	  this	  area	  the	  professional	  judgement	  of	  
educators	  seems	  likely	  to	  retain	  a	  significant	  role.	  
	  
Cognitive	  load	  measurements	  are	  also	  relative	  and	  transient	  and	  subject	  to	  a	  number	  of	  
individual	  and	  empirical	  factors	  that	  vary	  over	  time.	  Cognitive	  load	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  constant	  factor	  related	  only	  to	  objective	  features	  of	  instructional	  format	  or	  
content,	  and	  more	  developmental	  or	  longitudinal	  studies	  might	  add	  significantly	  to	  our	  
understanding	  as	  a	  result.	  Similarly,	  the	  number	  of	  separate	  interacting	  elements	  needed	  
to	  solve	  a	  task	  is	  an	  index	  of	  task	  complexity	  (intrinsic	  cognitive	  load),	  and	  increasing	  
task	  complexity	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  greater	  demands	  on	  cognitive	  resources,	  but	  
objective	  measures	  of	  task	  complexity	  (e.g.,	  by	  cognitive	  task	  analysis)	  are	  not	  currently	  
used	  in	  cognitive	  load	  research.	  Intrinsic	  load	  for	  a	  given	  task	  is	  also	  affected	  by	  individual	  
learner	  aptitudes	  such	  as	  prior	  expertise	  (Seufert,	  Jänen,	  &	  Brünken,	  2007),	  and	  it	  may	  
therefore	  be	  more	  useful	  to	  define	  task	  complexity	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  
that	  has	  to	  be	  extracted	  from	  a	  given	  information	  source	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  
learning	  task,	  and	  better	  statistical	  measures	  such	  as	  time	  series	  analysis	  have	  been	  
proposed	  to	  help	  with	  this	  in	  future	  research	  (Brünken,	  Seufert,	  &	  Paas,	  2010).	  
	  
What	  appears	  necessary	  for	  significant	  advances	  to	  be	  made	  in	  cognitive	  load	  research	  
are	  more	  unobtrusive	  and	  reliable	  means	  of	  continually	  monitoring	  different	  types	  of	  
cognitive	  demand	  in	  authentic	  learning	  situations	  over	  extended	  periods	  of	  time	  and	  
especially	  in	  complex	  or	  loosely	  structured	  domains.	  Measuring	  mental	  load	  has	  become	  the	  
single	  most	  problematic	  and	  important	  issue	  in	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  but:	  
	  
To	  date,	  there	  is	  no	  model	  integrating	  the	  role	  of	  learner	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  individual	  
differences	  in	  prior	  knowledge,	  working	  memory	  capacity,	  and	  domain-­‐specific	  abilities	  that	  
can	  help	  predict	  the	  relative	  intrinsic	  difficulty	  of	  the	  material	  for	  a	  specific	  learner	  in	  a	  specific	  
situation.	  (Brünken,	  Plass,	  &	  Moreno,	  2010,	  pp.	  257)	  
	  
Cognitive	  load	  theory	  argues	  that	  learning	  helps	  promote	  schema	  development	  and	  
acquisition,	  but	  this	  too	  is	  as	  yet	  unproven.	  Direct	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  the	  cognitive	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  schema	  acquisition	  comes	  about	  is	  lacking.	  As	  yet,	  we	  also	  have	  
no	  instruments	  to	  directly	  measure	  a	  learner’s	  working	  memory	  resources.	  We	  are	  still	  
working	  towards	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  how	  cognitive	  load	  relates	  to	  specific	  forms	  of	  
knowledge	  representation,	  although	  we	  have	  some	  evidence	  that	  these	  are	  closely	  linked	  
and	  that	  the	  type	  of	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  that	  a	  learner	  acquires	  depend	  upon	  the	  particular	  
kinds	  of	  mental	  representations	  promoted	  by	  instruction	  (Schnotz,	  Boeckheler,	  &	  Grzondziel,	  
1999;	  Wallen,	  Plass,	  &	  Brünken,	  2005).	  
	  
We	  also	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  what	  kinds	  of	  mental	  processes	  in	  instructional	  design	  will	  
best	  promote	  schema	  acquisition	  or	  of	  what	  kind.	  For	  example,	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  
appropriate	  image	  into	  textual	  learning	  materials	  tends	  to	  promote	  greater	  understanding	  
(Mayer,	  2001),	  but	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  has	  difficulty	  in	  explaining	  whether	  such	  an	  
arrangement	  causes	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  overall	  cognitive	  load,	  increases	  the	  germane	  
load,	  decreases	  the	  extraneous	  load,	  or	  enhances	  helpful	  schema	  formation.	  The	  
disentangling	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  load	  and	  successfully	  measuring	  them	  in	  valid	  and	  reliable	  
ways	  remains	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  research	  field.	  Understanding	  the	  basic	  foundations	  
of	  working	  memory	  is	  also	  an	  important	  priority	  for	  cognitive	  load	  theory	  as	  this	  
concept	  is	  central	  to	  its	  structure,	  but	  as	  yet	  the	  theory	  offers	  no	  explicit	  assumptions	  
about	  its	  architecture	  or	  operation.	  
	  
Some	  writers	  seriously	  doubt	  that	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  find	  the	  holy	  grail	  of	  cognitive	  
load	  theory,	  reliable	  and	  valid	  individual	  measures	  for	  the	  three	  types	  of	  cognitive	  load	  
(see	  Kirschner	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  although	  others	  report	  some	  limited	  progress	  (Leppink,	  
Paas,	  Van	  der	  Vleuten,	  Van	  Gog,	  &	  Van	  Merriënboer,	  2013).	  In	  general,	  there	  has	  
been	  limited	  success	  in	  disentangling	  and	  measuring	  different	  types	  of	  cognitive	  load,	  
and	  current	  research	  in	  this	  area	  features	  considerable	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  
cognitive	  load	  measures,	  when	  they	  are	  collected	  during	  an	  intervention	  and	  how	  
“efficiency”	  is	  defined	  and	  used.	  Securing	  valid	  and	  reliable	  metrics	  will	  need	  to	  take	  due	  
account	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  instruments	  used	  to	  measure	  cognitive	  
load	  and	  also	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  diagnosticity	  of	  them	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  ability	  of	  an	  
instrument	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  different	  types	  of	  mental/cognitive	  load	  –	  and	  
reduce	  the	  intrusiveness	  of	  the	  instrument,	  as	  an	  overly	  intrusive	  measure	  will	  interfere	  
more	  with	  the	  primary	  task	  performance	  (Yuan,	  Steedle,	  Shavelson,	  Alonzo,	  &	  Oppezzo,	  
2006;	  Wiebe,	  Roberts,	  &	  Behrend,	  2010).	  
	  
At	  the	  moment,	  many	  performance	  test	  results	  do	  not	  correlate	  well	  with	  the	  subjective	  
measures	  used,	  and	  one	  or	  other	  of	  the	  two	  effects	  (load	  and	  performance)	  will	  appear,	  but	  
not	  both,	  and	  they	  occasionally	  conflict	  each	  other	  or	  confound	  the	  theoretical	  argument	  
being	  applied.	  Attempts	  to	  discriminate	  between	  and	  measure	  more	  than	  one	  type	  of	  load	  
have	  been	  highly	  problematical	  and	  so	  far	  have	  tended	  to	  fail	  because	  outcomes	  have	  either	  
been	  inconsistent	  or	  highly	  correlated.	  However,	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  problems	  to	  
be	  solved	  are	  clearly	  identified,	  and	  despite	  all	  the	  remaining	  challenges,	  there	  are	  
indications	  that	  instruments	  such	  as	  fNIRS	  may	  offer	  ways	  towards	  empirical	  and	  objective,	  
valid,	  and	  reliable	  individual	  measures	  of	  cognitive	  load,	  and	  the	  field	  remains	  a	  rich	  source	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